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Some years ago, the idea that unconventional oil and gas resources could be developed outside 
of the United States (US) and Canada, triggering similar transformative effects for the 
economies concerned, caught the imagination of policy-makers, international organisations 
and researchers2. Evidence of unconventional resources3 in abundant quantities exists in many 
parts of the world. If large-scale development were to happen outside of North America, it 
would constitute a new phase in the commercial development of shale gas and oil: we might 
call it Shale 2.0. Undoubtedly, this would occur only if certain regulatory conditions were met, 
reflecting the very different and diverse circumstances of countries outside of North America, 
and the impacts of Shale 1.0. Yet, whatever the initial expectations of policy-makers and 
investors, this further, transnational phase has yet to happen. Despite evident interest among 
many governments in exploring the potential for unconventional resource development, and 
among a few investors, commercial activity has been evident in only a very few locations and 
on a large scale, mostly in one, the US.  
 
Two of the more commonly cited reasons for this lack of ‘take-off’ are the opposition from 
activist groups to such development in most countries with prospective resources (sometimes 
described in shorthand as the industry’s lack of a ‘social licence to operate’)4, and for a time 
the coincidental occurrence of a sharp decline in oil and gas prices between 2014 and 2017, 
leading to reduced interest in high-cost forms of energy5. Between 2014 and 2016, upstream 
oil and gas investment declined by 44%, but in 2017 there was a 53% increase in shale 
                                                 
1 The authors are grateful for the comments of Stephen Dow and Paul Griffin on an earlier draft. Neither bears 
any responsibility for this final version or any errors it may contain. 
2 For examples of this body of literature, see Grant Mark Nuelle, ‘Prospects for shale development outside the 
USA: evaluating nations’ regulatory and fiscal regimes for unconventional hydrocarbons’, 8 JWELB (2015) 232-
268; Susan L Sakmar, ‘The Global Shale Gas Initiative: Will the United States be the Role Model for the 
Development of Shale Gas around the World?’ (University of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2011-27). 
3 Usually, this comprises shale gas, tight gas, shale oil, coal bed methane, hydrates and biogenic gas. The term 
‘unconventional’ indicates that these resources are not capable of being extracted by drilling alone. They therefore 
take the extraction process closer in the direction of manufacturing, since they require the technologies of 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling: see P Stevens (2011) Parliamentary Evidence (London: Chatham 
House). In general, they also have higher capital intensity and operating costs than conventional resource activity, 
as well as greater water consumption and chemical use. 
4 Don C. Smith, Jessica M. Richards and R. J. Colwell (2017) ‘Where ‘shale’ we go from here: opportunities and 
challenges in shale plays located outside the USA’, 10 Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 159-219. 
5 This affects unconventional resources since they have costs attached to a lack of infrastructure and water 
availability, as well as swift production times, to name a few factors. 
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investment in the US6. If the latter source of constraint to shale activity proves to be only a 
temporary one, the former is unlikely to be so transient for countries outside of the USA7.  
 
This study is directed at the legal and regulatory variable in the attraction of investment in 
Shale 2.0. With its promise of enhancing energy independence, few would be so bold as to rule 
out the possibility that in some form and at some time it might happen. Indeed, by 2018 some 
evidence of a potential Shale 2.0 is already emerging8. With appropriate legal conditions, large-
scale investment in developing these resources may well take place. In its focus on the legal 
and regulatory variable, this study adopts a comparative approach, using several case studies 
to illustrate how particular legal, contractual and regulatory mechanisms have been drawn on 
in common and civil law jurisdictions, and how countries at dissimilar stages of development 
of their unconventional resources, have created strategies to stimulate investment and to 
regulate the operations related to these resources.  
 
In terms of our structure, we provide a brief overview of Shale 1.0 (Section 2), in time 
commencing around 2002 and ending with the oil price collapse in 2014. The idea is an 
analytical construct, intended to capture events and expectations that contrast with a later 
period of reassessment and transition to Shale 2.0. Several commentators have sought to 
identify and assess the conditions behind the US success in Shale 1.0, and to ask which ones 
were essential and whether some or any of these were or are present in other countries. The US 
experience occupies centre stage in Shale 1.0 not only existentially but also because of external 
perceptions of its experience, characterized by initial lofty expectations and subsequent 
scepticism. The mixture of positives and negatives is important. In the absence of alternative 
national experiences, the question became one of whether the US experience made it a ‘role 
                                                 
6 International Energy Agency, World Energy Investment 2017, 11. 
7 In the North American context, the first known fracking arbitration involving NAFTA Art 1128 commenced in 
2013. Lone Pine Resources v Canada concerns a claim by a US-registered company that the revocation of an 
exploration permit by the Province of Quebec amounts to an expropriation of its rights and requires compensation. 
Both the Governments of the US and Mexico have made submissions which are in the public domain and which 
appear to support the Canadian Government position (Investment Arbitration Reporter, 22 August 2017). The 
case is ongoing. 
8 Diverse examples of how Shale 2.0 might emerge include: evidence of very large shale oil deposits in Bahrain 
(Oil and Gas Journal, 16 April 2018); increasing shale gas production in China with 700 wells forecast between 
2018 and 2020 (Reuters, 16 April 2018), lifting of a moratorium on fracking in Australia’s Northern Territory 




model’ or a unique case9. Even at an early stage, it was clear that some features were unique to 
this setting10. It is the ‘base jurisdiction’ for our study. 
 
 
The core of our paper (Sections 3 to 5) is an examination of three countries that have taken 
policy decisions to advance a shale resources agenda, but which reflect dissimilar stages in the 
development of these resources. In each case, the subsoil minerals are publicly owned, the State 
has a pervasive role in hydrocarbons activity and to a greater or lesser extent conventional 
hydrocarbons activity is already established under an officially sanctioned regulatory system. 
Since our interest lies in the kinds of legal instrument and related good industry practices that 
make unconventional resource development possible, we have chosen countries that have a 
positive policy towards this new industry. We are aware that other countries have taken a 
different approach, prohibiting its development. Our selection does not involve making a 
judgment for or against the development of shale gas or oil. Rather, it follows from our research 
goal of exploring the initial legal instruments and emerging practices that are deemed 
appropriate to this still relatively new kind of hydrocarbons operations.  
 
The countries we have selected for our study are threefold. First, there is Argentina, the country 
which outside of the United States probably has the most proven resources of unconventional 
hydrocarbons in the world, mostly located in a single geological formation, known with the 
unpromising name of ´Vaca Muerta´ or ‘Dead Cow’. Currently, Argentina is one of a handful 
of countries in the world that has unconventional hydrocarbons in production. Its approach and 
its practices therefore make it an ideal case for studying practices that are likely to become a 
part of Shale 2.0. Second, we have selected Colombia, a country like Argentina with a civil 
law system, and one which has identified substantial resources to be exploited. It is developing 
a legal framework to facilitate this and is planning for exploration and production. Finally, we 
have selected The United Kingdom, a common law country11, which became one of the first 
countries outside of the US to drill exploration wells in 2011; subsequently, a variety of 
                                                 
9 See citations in Notes 1 and 2, and The Wall Street Journal. IEA Sees Spread of Shale Gas Revolution Before 
the End of the Decade. June 17, 2014. 
Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/iea-sees-spread-of-shale-revolution-before-end-of-decade-
1402988483. 
10 For example, the report by Chatham House: Paul Stevens (2010) The ‘Shale Gas Revolution’: Hype and 
Reality? (London: Chatham House) and, with greater emphasis on the downside of shale developments, (2012) 
The Shale Gas Revolution: Developments and Changes. 
11 Scotland has a mixed common and civil law system but since it has effectively banned unconventional 
hydrocarbons activity, it is not considered in any detail in the parts of this paper that address the UK. 
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obstacles from local government reviews to decisions to impose moratoria and even to ban 
shale gas developments, have slowed plans to drill wells and build a new industry. 
 
The case studies draw upon the synthetic analyses of national experts in energy law from the 
above three countries. Each case study covers five broad issues relevant to Shale 2.0 in a 
country setting: how the country and particularly its government reacted to Shale 1.0; what the 
existing hydrocarbons regime was like; what measures were taken to promote and regulate 
unconventional resources; the challenges that became evident and what solutions were 
developed locally to meet them, and an assessment of the emerging shape of regulation for 
Shale 2.0. Within each heading, there is some variation in the coverage given the evolving 
nature of the subject matter and the impact of circumstances, policy priorities or the state of 
sector development. Some concluding comments are made based on a comparative analysis of 
common features and contrasting approaches to the regulation of unconventional hydrocarbons 
(Section 6).  
 
Other countries might have been chosen of course, even though very few provide examples of 
production activity. A criterion that influenced our choice was the availability of reliable data 
relevant to an analysis of a regulatory regime for unconventional hydrocarbons. China has 
extensive deposits of shale gas and considerable potential, but we did not feel our access was 
likely to yield the quality of data that we were seeking12. A further consideration was whether 
the hydrocarbons regime in a country was open to international investment: regimes which are 
closed are not likely to be influential on the development of transnational practice in this area. 
 
The comparisons and contrasts drawn out through these three country studies may yield fresh 
insights into this question of investment promotion in what we have called the Shale 2.0 phase. 
In that sense, we aim to contribute to a growing body of multi-disciplinary scholarship 
                                                 
12 The emerging regime is strongly supported by both Central and Provincial government authorities through 
development planning and subsidies, with engineering services and infrastructure construction being built up to 
achieve energy security goals. BP appears to be the only IOC involved, with activity in shale gas dominated by 
Sinopec rather than Petrochina, the main gas producer (and BP’s partner). High costs, plus the need to drill beyond 
3,500 metres and the location of shale in blocks already licensed for conventional resource development are 
among the blocks to rapid development. For further published analysis, see Jianghua Chen, Shale Gas Exploration 
and Development Progress in China and the Way Forward (2018) IOP Conf. Ser.: Earth Environ. Sci. 113 012178; 
P D Farah and R Tremolada, ‘A Comparison between Shale Gas in China and Unconventional Fuel Development 
in the United States: Water, Environmental Protection, and Sustainable Development’, Brooklyn J Int’l Law 
(2016) 580-654. Older, but informative analyses include: Sandelow, D, Wu, Jingdao, Yang, Q, Hove, A and J 
Lin, ‘Meeting China’s Shale Gas Goals’, Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy (2014), and Fan Gao, ‘Will 
there be a Shale Gas Revolution in China by 2020?’ Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2012). 
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surrounding unconventional oil and gas and the technologies that support it. Our aim of 
contributing to it springs from a belief that the body of knowledge required - if investment in 
the complex Shale 2.0 context is ever likely to materialise - will be richer, deeper and more 
reflective in character than was evident in the making of Shale 1.0. One of the outcomes of that 
research could be the development of a body of standards, or ‘best international industry 
practice’ that may assist governments that seek to design or to benchmark regulatory regimes 
in this area. 
 
By way of a caveat, it should not be thought that the authors are unaware of the arguments 
against the development of shale oil and gas or that they are advocates of such development in 
general or in any special context. Within the USA, the heart of Shale 1.0, there are influential 
bodies in several States that have acted to limit shale development, taking a critical view of the 
balance of costs and benefits. Indeed, there is a long tradition of imposing strict limits to 
conventional hydrocarbons or mining activities in certain areas such as national parks or urban 
areas with dense populations. The idea of imposing constraints is neither new nor unreasonable. 
It does not preclude development of hydrocarbons in other less socially or environmentally 
sensitive areas. In this case, the relative novelty of the application of several technologies, and 
their continued evolution and enhancement, means that regulation of unconventional 
hydrocarbons is likely to require periodic review to ensure it is appropriate to the kind of 
operations involved in their development. However, at this stage very little regulation has in 
fact been put in place outside of North America, and what exists is far from being tried and 
tested. The focus of this study lies then not in assessing the adequacy of an established form of 
regulation but in tracking the evolution of national practices as the source of an emerging 




2. Shale 1.0: the US as Model or Warning? 
2.1 Shale 1.0’s Beating Heart 
The narrative of unconventional energy’s growth in the US is a compelling one and has often 
been described13. It forms an essential part of an already considerable literature on the various 
economic, technological and legal impacts of Shale 1.014. Its impact on the US economy has 
been dramatic: from being a country that was increasingly dependent on imports of oil and gas 
throughout the later twentieth century, it has been transformed by the development of domestic 
unconventional oil and gas resources into one that is self-sufficient, and export-oriented. Its 
wider impacts on US industry have also been much commented upon. On some estimates, 
energy costs to US industry have dropped by a third while European competitors faced 
increases of more than 50 percent15. The increased demand for metallic products, such as pipes 
and other equipment to allow the metallurgical industry to grow at a rapid rate: by 2011 “US 
Steel invested $95 million in an Ohio plant to help meet the demand from shale gas extraction 
activities (…). Vallourec was spending $650 million on a new plant in Ohio to supply steel 
pipe for companies extracting shale gas”16. At the same time, opposition to the new industry 
has been intense and vocal from the outset, particularly in the more densely populated parts of 
the USA, driven by environmental concerns and leading to a lack of a ‘social licence to operate’ 
in some areas17. 
 
This sudden if complex change in the energy mix of the largest energy consumer in the world 
not only attracted international attention but was also coupled with publication of data 
                                                 
13 For example, Gregory Zuckerman, The Frackers. Portfolio Penguin (2013); and Susan L Sakmar, ‘The Global 
Shale Gas Initiative: Will the United States be the Role Model for the Development of Shale Gas around the 
World? (University of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2011-27.  
14 On taxation of shale gas, there is a comprehensive working paper from the International Monetary Fund: P 
Daniel, A Krupnick, T Matheson, P Mullins, I Parry and A Swistak, ‘How Should Shale Gas Extraction be 
Taxed?’(http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2017/11/16/How-Should-Shale-Gas-Extraction-Be-
Taxed-45410). On the wider economic issues, examples are C Hausman and R Kellog (2015) ‘Welfare and 
Distributional Implications of Shale Gas’. Working Paper 21, 115, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, MA; C. Mason, L Muelenbachs and S Olmstead (2015). ‘The Economics of Shale Gas Development’. 
Annual Review of Resource Economics. Impacts on energy markets are discussed in P Brehm (2015) ‘Natural Gas 
Prices, Electricity Generation Investment, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions’. Working Paper, University of 
Michigan, and J. Kepes, B Rodgers and P. van Meurs (2011) ‘Gas Prices, other Factors indicate Changes in North 
American/Shale Play Fiscal Systems’. Oil and Gas Journal 56-66. Timothy Fitzgerald (2013) discusses the 
technological aspects of hydraulic fracturing: ‘Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing’, 63 Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 1337-1362.  
15 Ventocilla (2016), JWELB. 
16 PWC. Shale Gas: A renaissance in the US Manufacturing. 2011. 
17 The social licence to operate is the issue that Don Smith et al (2017) focus on and propose a model based on 
Colorado state practice to address this. 
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suggesting that similar geological formations were present in many other parts of the world18. 
If the geology was indeed favourable in terms of reserve quantity and accessibility, what 
conditions were required to replicate the shale energy revolution outside of North America, 
and would governments act to facilitate it? For many a policy-maker in energy importing 
countries, it seemed to offer a way of providing a secure and constant supply of hydrocarbons 
to their domestic industries and homes, and yet avoid the costs of importing energy. At the 
same time, media reports of popular concerns about its potential impacts encouraged many 
governments to impose prohibitions and similar constraints on prospective operations: in 
Bulgaria, France, Germany, Romania and South Africa, and at a subnational level in Australia, 
Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, the UK (Scotland, Wales) and the USA (including New York, 
Vermont and cities and counties in California, Colorado, Texas and Ohio). 
An enquiry into the ingredients for success and whether they could be replicated elsewhere lay 
behind much of the literature and media coverage of the ‘Shale Revolution’. Apart from 
geology, the key criteria seemed to be: economics, infrastructure availability, equipment and 
crucially, whether such activity was to be permitted by the government concerned. In the 
diverse and abundant commentary that has followed, we might distinguish two broad 
approaches19: the first identified and examined the factors behind its success in the US (and 
largely ignored developments in Western Canada) and then asked how many of these were 
available outside the US and whether the absence of any of them was significant; the second 
adopted a different approach and focussed on what ‘success’ meant in the US context, with a  
focus on the social cost and the sometimes tacit question: can it last? While it is the first of 
these that concerns us in this paper, in the next few paragraphs we shall briefly review each of 
these perspectives and what insights they have yielded. 
                                                 
18 The US Energy Information Administration analysed 48 shale gas basins in 32 countries and based on its 
estimates of technically recoverable reserves of shale gas in Europe, the European Centre for Energy and Resource 
Security argued that they had the potential to meet European gas demand for at least another 60 years: Financial 
Times, May 12, 2011: Critics try to stifle the shale gas revolution. This data is probably incomplete and understates 
potential in the Middle East and some other source rocks for shale gas and shale oil. However, for data gathering 
purposes the next question is how much of this is commercially extractable at a certain price.   
19 See the citations in foregoing footnotes 1, 4, 9 and 12. 
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Characteristics of Shale 1.0  
The eight principal factors that contributed to the Shale Revolution in North America are 
usually thought to be the following20:  
• Private ownership of subsurface mineral rights – which permits surface access and 
limits legal challenges to rapid development (enabling legislation and regulations may 
serve to replicate this as an incentive but is unlikely to allow for the same degree of 
rapid development); 
• Independent gas companies with the necessary technical knowledge and the incentive 
to apply or develop it; and service companies… 
• Pre-existing pipeline infrastructure and capacity 
• Fairly abundant water supplies 
• Low population density – which limits public opposition 
• Deep capital markets 
• High natural gas prices, and gas demand 
• Royalties and taxes, which are sensitive to the unconventional net cash flow profile and 
cost base. 
The use of combined techniques, such as hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling and seismic 
mapping, became a general practice in different areas of the United States during the decade 
from 1990 and led to better rates of production in 2003 and 200421. Unconventional resources 
had long been known but what was new was the application of hydraulic fracturing involving 
the opening of shale rock by means of the fracturing, then injecting thousands of tonnes of 
water, sand and other additives underground at high pressure. However, it was not until 2007 
that a substantial growth in the production of hydrocarbons started to become relevant at the 
level of the national energy mix and initiated what at the time was often referred to as the ‘shale 
revolution’. At that time, production of shale gas reached 8% of the total natural gas production 
in the USA, with significant impacts on the industry, the prices and the economy.22 
                                                 
20 The following list is a synthesis of similar lists in publications by P Stevens (2010) and P Daniel et al (2018). 
21  Around 2 billion cubic feet (BcF) per day from the Barnett Shale formation, overtaking the production from 
more traditional areas in the Appalachian basin in Ohio or the Michigan Basin. 
22 Last visited: http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/sec2.pdf 
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A switch from coal powered generation plants to gas powered ones followed: in 2001 only 
17% of the power generated used gas as fuel, while coal was the main source for production 
with 51%; by 2012, 31% came from gas and 36% came from coal23. In 2010 alone, 2,200 MW 
of gas powered energy was introduced into the market, an equivalent of 84% net new 
capacity24. 
While other factors may have affected the industry decision to change its fuel for electricity 
generation, the reduced price of gas was one of the main drivers for this change. Another 
contributing factor may have been the impact of policies to reduce CO2 emissions, which was 
adopted by environmental authorities in the US; this factor makes gas more advantageous than 
coal, from an environmental perspective. Academics have measured the potential impact that 
the reduction of emission by the changing on fuel for the generation of power to be between 
35% and 50% from the national peak in 200525. 
Another element that has been attributed to the increase of gas production caused by the shale 
gas exploration and production, is a phenomenon of regeneration and improvement in some 
industries that were in decline or had disappeared in the United States. The activities and effects 
of shale gas activity affected the economic performance of the states where the major 
formations were located, and where the activity and production were occurring. Increases in 
employment related to the industry or improvements on the general economic performance of 
towns, counties and states, are some of the positive effects that shale gas brought to the 
communities. 
Several studies have analyzed the economic impact that the states and towns involved in the 
shale gas revolution have experienced. Some of them have initiated arguments on how the 
measurement of the positive effect has been done, and how much of the actual benefit has a 
long-lasting effect on the economy26. Other studies with a more optimistic view base their 
conclusions on the increase on jobs, tax revenues and local or regional gross product.  
                                                 
23 Yanagisawa, A. Impacts of shale gas revolution on natural gas and coal demand. IEEJ. 2013. Another 
contributory factor is the need for renovation of non-efficient coal-powered plants. Due to several environmental 
regulations issued by the Environmental protection Agency, as well as the increase on efficiency of combined 
cycle gas turbine powered plants, has made that the switch from coal to gas, has been welcomed within a context 
of favourable fuel (gas) price. 
24 Broderick, J and Anderson, K. Has US Shale Gas Reduced CO2 Emissions. Tyndall Centre. 2012. 
25 Broderick, J and Anderson, K. Has US Shale Gas Reduced CO2 Emissions. Tyndall Centre. 2012. 
26 Munasib, A and Rickman, D.  Regional economic Impacts of the shale gas and tight oil boom: A synthetic 
control analysis. Regional Science and Urban Economics. Vol. 50. 2015. 
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An example of this is the increase in number of jobs in the state of Pennsylvania with 29,000 
new jobs in 2008 and tax revenues of $238 million. A more general approach of the 
development of the Marcellus shale formation (including West Virginia and Pennsylvania), 
improved the gross regional product by $4.8 billion, created 57.000 new jobs and brought $1.7 
billion in local, state and federal taxes, all in 2009. Texas and the development of the Barnett 
formation is another example where clear numbers illustrate the economic prosperity that shale 
gas has brought to some of the regions where it is developed. In Texas, in 2011, the regional 
output related with shale gas is of $1.11 billion equivalent to 8.1% of the region’s economy, as 
well as 100,000 jobs, equivalent to 10% of the employment of the region27. 
 
Critique of Shale 1.0 
Two strands of criticism emerged at an early stage. Too many of the ingredients of success 
were specific to the North American context and could not be replicated elsewhere. Further, 
there were important negative environmental impacts of the shale technologies which would 
undermine social acceptance.  
On the first strand in the shale critique, there are many surface challenges that may prevent 
widespread development of shale potential in the US and beyond28. If one looks to the US 
effort, the scale of the practical challenge becomes evident. In terms of the capital commitment, 
the success rate is around ten per cent in developing new shale deposits or ‘plays’ in the US, 
with each play typically requiring 50-100 wells to ‘crack the code’ to commerciality and taking 
between three and five years. Most of the plays fail in a range of between five and fifteen wells 
drilled. For individual companies, this is a demanding requirement to have both capacity for 
the capital load and investors patient enough to wait for a return once commerciality is proven. 
For countries outside the US, this context is even more off-putting. One review of several areas: 
Argentina (Vaca Muerta), Australia (Cooper Basin) and China (Sichuan), concluded that 
outside of North America shale once produced is likely to prove expensive. 
The regulatory approach is replete with challenges if the US experience is an indicator. First, 
there is a need to adapt any existing regime for conventional resources, including provision for 
                                                 
27 Sovacool, B. Cornucopia or curse: Reviewing the costs and benefits of shale gas hydraulic fracturing (fracking). 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews. Vol 37. 2014. 
28 Moyes & Co.: AIPN Model Contracts Workshop, June 2015: Presentation on Unconventional Resources. 
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an ability to hold undeveloped acreage positions and drill as needed to provide hydrocarbon 
volumes for a period of 40 to 60 years. Second, the regime needs to be able to process a high 
volume of permits and the relevant paperwork for drilling, completion and pipeline 
construction. Local councils need to be supportive of this activity. This social acceptance is 
key since the projects absorb copious quantities of sand and water and truckloads of equipment 
and liquids, causing significant disruption unless the areas are remote. Early evidence from the 
US suggests that the reinjection of produced water underground through disposal wells is 
responsible for the measurable rise in the number of earthquakes with a magnitude of 3.0 in 
the State of Oklahoma, for example29.  
However, there was also concern about negative effects peculiar to this manner of developing 
unconventional hydrocarbons. The main ones were: the risk of ground and surface water 
contamination arising from well integrity; the intense use of resources such as water and land; 
and the risk that induced seismic activity would cause earthquakes. 
Several concerns over the protection of aquifers and water resources have been identified by 
citizens and academics. Some argue that the fracturing process or the lack of stability of the 
wells, could lead to the contamination of water supplies from the filtration of chemical fluids 
used in the process30. Others have raised concerns on the possibility of methane leaks into the 
atmosphere, creating another risk of air pollution31. 
Other potential risks associated with the production of unconventional hydrocarbons refer to 
the substantial use of water for the fracturing work, and to the use of that water, after it has 
been injected into the ground. The management and potential reuse of the water, has caused 
concerns amongst the population and some organizations32.  
The final disposition of the produced water, has become an issue, and in some states, it has 
been re-injected into the ground. This practice and the fracturing of the underground, has been 
associated with the increase of tremors and seismic events in some states33. 
                                                 
29 Ibid. From zero per annum the number of earthquakes increased to 584 in 2014. 
30 Vengosh et al. The Effects of Shale Gas exploration and Hydraulic Fracturing on the Quality of Water Resources 
in the United States. Procedia Earth and Planetary Science. Vol 7.  2013. 
31 Carnegie Mellon University. Shale Gas and the Environment: Critical Need for a Government-University- 
Industry Research Initiative. 2013. 
32 Groundwater Protection council. U.S. Produced Water Volumes and Management. 2012. 
33 Ellsworth, W.L.  injection-Induced Earthquakes. Science. Vol. 341. July 2013. 
15 
 
The abovementioned potential risks that have been associated with shale gas resources 
development but have been addressed by federal and state governments. In principle, the 
development of environmental protection laws, regulations and guidelines can address the 
above risks, and the ones adopted in the US may provide a lead in their design for application 
in other jurisdictions. However, from a legal point of view, fracking can also generate litigation 
such as claims that plaintiffs have suffered personal injuries because of pollutants released 
because of fracking operations. This could arise from the release of chemical compounds into 
the air or fracking fluids leaking into the soil and well water. A more complex problem arises 
from the long-term effects of these processes and the legacy of defunct operations many years 
later. 
What’s it all about? Thinking beyond Shale 1.0 
In using the term Shale 1.0, we are not only characterising the immense increase in production 
in gas and oil that was evident in the USA, and the legal frameworks that made it possible. In 
our view, it also refers to the body of scholarly research and legal analysis that it triggered in 
many countries. This involved academics, legal professionals, government bodies, scientific 
associations, international organisations and industry associations. The body of knowledge 
about unconventional resources has grown at an exponential rate in the past decade. Ironically, 
outside of North America shale activity has evolved at a pace far slower than the volume of 
literature on the subject. A great deal has been written on the evolving legal regimes in various 
country settings34.  
 
2.2 Moving Beyond Shale 1.0: Adapting Regulation and Contracts   
It is perhaps unsurprising that despite the differences between unconventional and conventional 
hydrocarbon resources, the legal and regulatory frameworks that have been initially designed 
for unconventional energy have been closely modelled on their tried and tested counterparts 
                                                 
34 There are many examples, but a few are given below: W Baginski, Shale Gas in Poland – The Legal Framework 
for Granting Concessions for Prospecting and Exploration of Hydrocarbons (2011), 32 Energy Law Journal, 145; 
Mostafa I Elshazly, The Legal and Contractual Framework pertaining to the Exploration and Production of Shale 
Gas in Egypt, 8 JWELB (2015) 385-390; David AW Maloney, ‘Unconventional oil and gas in Australia: a case 
of regulatory lag’, 33 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 349-404; Brian J Preston, ‘Unconventional 
Natural Gas in the Courts: An Overview’ (2014) 32 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 377-424; an 
overview of the regimes in place in many countries was compiled by the law firm, Baker & McKenzie: Shale Gas: 
An International Guide (2014)(2nd edn, October). 
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for conventional sources of energy. Since the economics and the extraction techniques are 
different, it is to be expected that the legal regimes will eventually be adapted to reflect this. 
Indeed, lawyers, commercial negotiators and advisers with industry clients have been among 
early commentators on the legal implications of the specific features of unconventional energy 
resources35. In spite of the fact of state ownership and extensive control in most countries, the 
design of rules for the energy industry in a new field is not only a matter for governments. 
Some early attempts at designing common frameworks have already emerged from industry 
associations and regional bodies.  
An early example of the focus on specifics of the new unconventional sector was the 2014 
AIPN adaptation of its Model International Joint Operating Agreement (2012) for potential use 
in connection with unconventional resource deposits. It also issued Guidance on the use of the 
Unconventional Resources Operating Agreement (UROA). More than 160 industry 
representatives from 26 countries were involved in drafting this model, the first of its kind. It 
covers joint operations in shale oil and gas, tight oil and gas, coalbed methane and other 
unconventional production methodologies involving wellbore operations. The modifications 
consider key differences unique to unconventional resources such as pilot projects, sub-areas, 
multi-pad drilling and production, and other features of horizontal drilling. This was – and is - 
an attempt at developing in a prospective way a measure of standardisation in transnational 
contractual practice.  
Among the features of unconventional resources that require some special consideration by 
governments in adapting their existing regime design from conventional to unconventional 
resource development are the following four36: 
  
Operational considerations. The higher density of wells and on-land base for exploration, 
appraisal, development and production operations leads to a greater demand for land access 
authorizations and operational permits. A well for shale gas will typically run vertically down 
                                                 
35 In a two-part article, Peter Roberts examined how a conventional joint operating agreement would need to be 
modified to reflect the nuances of an on-land shale gas project: ‘UK Shale Gas Prospects – Preparing Bespoke 
Joint Operating Agreements and Gas Sales Agreements’ in 31 and 32 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources 
Law (2013 and 2014), 407-424 and 41-57; the Baker & McKenzie study on Shale (2014) discusses this as does 
the guidance to the AIPN UROA (see Trinh Chubbock (2014), ‘The First AIPN Model Contract for 
Unconventional Resource Operations’: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=535b3956-b32d-4498-
9065-f37de5fadb31). 




to the shale layer for about a mile and then extend horizontally, possibly for as much as two 
miles, potentially going under the land of many owners.  
 
Environment and social regulation. The potential impact and perceived risks on the surface 
land, air quality, and underground water resources mean that regulation is required. In practice, 
the risks of groundwater contamination from the fracking process itself are likely to be less 
common than those arising from improperly managed sludge and fracking pits and improperly 
disposed fracking fluids. Such fluids typically contain methane, ethane, and volatile organic 
compounds, which may be hazardous to health if not contained and disposed of during fracking 
operations. Air pollution may also arise from inadvertent venting of substances into the 
atmosphere and affecting the quality of air in the surrounding areas. 
  
Fiscal incentives. These are required when the cost of unconventional operations is 
substantially higher than for conventional ones. This could mean reduced royalty rates, a tax 
credit or more favourable schemes for cost recovery, and a profit gas split. This approach is 
less justified if there is an additional profits tax or a profit-sharing scheme in place, because in 
that event the economic criterion on which it is typically based will allow for an automatic 
integration of the economic differences between conventional and unconventional gas. 
 
Licensing systems. Adjustments would be needed to existing provisions on exploration and 
appraisal periods, work commitments, the definition of an unconventional gas field, and 
submission of development plans. Where rights have already been awarded specifically for 
conventional petroleum or coal exploration and production in a given area, new rules may 
allow the award of separate rights for unconventional resources. In Indonesia, for example, 
regulations give a priority access to holders of existing rights if they wish to seek rights over 
unconventional resources. The PSC for coal bed methane has a term of 30 years, including an 
initial exploration term of six years, which may be extended by four years for assessing the 
viability of a commercial coal-bed methane project.  
 
Indeed, industry associations have played a key role in establishing a body of good 
international petroleum practice since the earliest days of conventional hydrocarbons 
development. In another example of a recent initiative by industry, a body known as the UK 
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Onshore Operators Group (UKOOG) has published the ‘UK Onshore Shale Gas Well 
Guidelines’, setting out best practice for shale well operations37. 
At an early stage the question was raised of whether a regional framework for shale 
development could emerge on a European basis led by European Union institutions. In 2011 a 
report was submitted to the European Commission that examined various aspects of 
unconventional gas in the European context38. No commercial scale shale gas production was 
in place at the time. The EU had begun deliberations on possible actions to take, probably with 
the aim of proposing a harmonised regime across the EU39. However, Article 194 of the Treaty 
for the European Union gives each member state the right “to determine the conditions for 
exploiting its energy sources, its choice between different energy sources and the general 
structure of its energy supply”. This shared competence between the member state and the EU 
institution created obstacles for regulatory action in this new field40, making any binding 
measures difficult to secure approval for. In January 2014 the European Commission adopted 
a Recommendation setting out minimum principles for member states when applying or 
adapting their legislation on conventional hydrocarbons to shale operations41. The thrust is to 
safeguard public health, climate and the environment, to ensure that resources are used 
efficiently and to keep the public informed of the activities. It was adopted according to Article 
292 of the TFEU and is not legally binding on member states. Divergent approaches to shale 
                                                 
37 UK Onshore Shale Gas Well Guidelines: Exploration and Appraisal Phase, 2013: 
http://www.ukoog.org.uk/images/ukoog/pdfs/ShaleGasWellGuidelines.pdf: “the initial operations will be treated 
as a pilot to ensure that high standards of safety and environmental management are achieved and to enable the 
guidelines to be fully evaluated”. The Guidelines are careful to emphasise that they are limited in scope to the 
first two phases of shale activity and are the first iteration, to be modified in the light of knowledge gained from 
the experience of initial operations.  
38 Philippe & Partners, Final Report on Unconventional Gas in Europe: 8 November 2011. The main purpose of 
the Study was “to analyse how the relevant applicable European legal framework, including environmental law, 
is applied to the licensing/authorisation and operational permitting for prospection, exploration and 
production/exploitation of shale gas based on a sample of four Member States, i.e. Poland, France, Germany and 
Sweden” (p.5). Since that time there has been further research into the European regulatory framework: for 
example, L Reins, Regulating Shale Gas – the Challenge of Coherent Environmental and Energy Regulation 
(2017) Edward Elgar, London.  
39 The European Parliament Briefing of December 2014 summarises the energy security aspect behind this debate: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/542167/EPRS_BRI(2014)542167_REV1_EN.pdf 
40 K de Smedt and A Rigamonti, Towards a Common Framework for Shale Gas Extraction in the EU [2013] 21 
Env. Liability: Law, Policy and Practice, 145-153: “Ultimately, it will be the Member States that will decide to 
engage in shale gas exploration and extraction” (at 153).  
41 Recommendation 2014/17/EU: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.039.01.0072.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2014:039:TOC. A Communication 
was issued at the same time, providing background to the Recommendation and its assumptions: COM (2014) 
23 final/2: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0023R(01)&from=EN 
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development among the member states and partners seem very likely to result from this 
approach, particularly after the impact of the UK exit from the EU.  
  
2.3 Conclusions 
From the above overview – which makes no claims to being comprehensive - it should be clear 
that the body of knowledge that exists for designing laws and key contractual documents for 
unconventional resource activity is already evolving. The remarkably slow expansion of shale 
activity almost everywhere in the world contrasts markedly with its resilience in the US. 
However, there is a difference between a slow emergence and no emergence at all. Despite the 
many moratoria and prohibitions in countries around the world, there are several areas in which 
it is being encouraged by governments not least for reasons of energy security policy. The 
probability that it will not resemble the US industry is hardly an indicator that it will fail to 
emerge. 
In 2018 alone, as prices rise once again, there have been some notable relevant developments. 
Apart from the discovery of what appear to be significant deposits of unconventional gas in 
Bahrain, mentioned earlier, there is a growing expansion of shale gas in China and a recent 
report in the industry’s potential in Australia’s Northern Territory argued that the risks can be 
adequately managed42.  
In the following sections, the legal development of shale resources in three countries will be 
presented in a case study format, noting how the regulatory structures have evolved and how 
the authorities have addressed their own local problems to facilitate a contribution of shale to 
their energy mix. 
  
                                                 




3. Case Study 1: Argentina 
3.1 Reacting to Shale 1.0 
Among the countries that have sought to replicate the US ‘shale revolution’, Argentina stands 
out. The country is ranked in the ‘top 5’ in terms of global shale oil and gas endowment and is 
a potential shale ‘giant’. Building on the geology, the government has taken steps to introduce 
special contractual arrangements for unconventional resource development and generally to 
provide legal and economic stability to investors. Progress in developing the Vaca Muerte or 
‘Dead Cow’ formation in the Province of Neuquen has been rapid despite logistical issues 
(infrastructure, skills and the modest size of the oil services sector, for example) and - in the 
background - some tensions between the federal and provincial authorities over their respective 
competencies. With the prospect of exporting gas to Chile, the country could become an energy 
hub in Latin America. 
 
Even while the geology was present from the very beginning in Argentina, the industry – 
comprising majors and independents – took the view that they had to “crack its code”. Four 
years of intense initial exploration followed, with more than 800 drilled wells: 629 with 
oil/condensate production and 497 all in only one block and 549 operated by the state company, 
YPF; 137 wells with dry and wet shale gas production, and 98 in effective production. The 
learning curve of the Vaca Muerta shale play has probably reached its peak. As Table 3.1 
illustrates, productivity rates of horizontal wells aiming to extract hydrocarbons from the 
“Dead Cow” have been increasing year on year and match those of the US shale plays.  
 
However, in policy terms Argentina has had to accompany this activity with some significant 
wider economic reforms to secure further investment into its economy. From 2016 onwards, 
features of the macroeconomic context included the Administration’s settlement of the public 
debt arising from the ‘holdouts’, elimination of foreign exchange restrictions, reduction of 
inflation, and importantly, ensuring that these measures were explained as part of a wider 






Table 3.1 Source: G&G Energy Consultants, April 2018. 
 
From a sector standpoint, the Government was active in progressing the “to do list” requested 
by energy experts and industry players: it introduced a “contract-for-differences” scheme that 
guarantees a minimum price for shale or tight gas; it pushed for an amendment to the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement between oil companies and oil workers that slashes labor costs; it 
eliminated exports taxes on hydrocarbons; it is overhauling the import regime for equipment 
and consumables required to develop oil fields; and it is investing heavily to improve the roads 
and railways connecting Vaca Muerta`s fields with the supply chain and domestic market.  
 
3.2 The Legal and Policy Framework 
Since the first discovery of oil in 1907 there has been an ongoing controversy between the 
Federal Government and the provinces regarding the eminent domain of the hydrocarbons 
reserves and the authority to legislate on the matter. The Constitution delegated to the Federal 
Government (i.e. Congress and implementing regulations issued by the Executive Branch) the 
authority to establish the substantive rules governing the exploration and production of crude 
oil and gas, thus ensuring the uniformity of legislation.43 However, despite this clarity about 
legislative power, the eminent domain of the hydrocarbons reserves has shifted between the 
provinces and the Federal Government, and this has had practical consequences for the grant 
                                                 
43 See Article 75 subsection 12 of the Argentine Constitution. The Federal Supreme Court, interpreting this 
constitutional provision, held that the power delegated to the Federal Government to legislate on mining refers to 
all types of mines, among which hydrocarbon fields are included (see Rulings 301:341 and 311:1265).     
YEAR YPF OTHERS TOTAL
2011 20 2 22
2012 25 22 47
2013 104 29 133
2014 160 23 183
2015 178 22 200
2016 103 17 120
2017 64 45 109
Jan-Feb 18 9 31 40
TOTAL 663 191 854
SHALE WELLS DRILLED & COMPLETED 
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of exploitation concessions and exploration permits, the collection of royalties and the level of 
involvement of the national and provincial authorities. In the most recent iteration of this 
pendulum swing, a Constitutional amendment in 1994 allowed the provinces to recover 
ownership rights over the natural resources found in their territory.44 
 
Since the enactment of Law 26,197 in December 2006 (the Re-Provincialization Law), the 
provinces became the enforcement authority of the Federal Hydrocarbons Law (FHL) 45 within 
their relevant jurisdictions.46 While the Re-Provincialization Law expressly maintains the 
uniformity of substantive legislation by keeping the effectiveness of the FHL and its 
implementing rules and by requiring the provinces to abide by such regulation, it recognizes 
several rights as vesting in the Provinces, including the following:47 
i. To grant new exploration permits and production concessions over the hydrocarbons 
located within their territories; 
ii. To extend the terms of the current and new permits, concessions and contracts; 
iii. To approve their assignment; 
iv. To revoke the same upon material breaches or causes set forth in the FHL; 
v. To impose penalties; and, 
vi. To exercise, in general, all the powers inherent to their condition as Enforcement 
Authority. 
 
The Federal Government preserves all such rights in relation to off-shore blocks beyond 12 
miles.48 
 
Finally, in line with the principle set out in the Constitution and the FHL, the Re-
Provincialization Law vests in the Federal Executive Branch the sole authority to design the 
federal energy policies.49 
 
                                                 
44 See Article 124 of the Argentine Constitution.  
45 Law N° 17,319.  
46 See Article 2 of the Re-Provincialization Law.  
47 See Article 2 first and third paragraphs and Article 6 of the Re-Provincialization Law. 
48 See Article 1 of Federal Hydrocarbons Law as amended by Article 1 second paragraph of the Re-
Provincialization Law. 
49 See Article 3 of the Federal Hydrocarbons and Article 2 fourth paragraph of the Re-Provincialization Law.  
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3.3 Regulating to Promote Unconventional Hydrocarbons 
3.3.1 Exploitation Concessions 
The FHL conceives a system of exploration permits and production concessions awarded by 
the State (Federal or Provincial, depending on the location of the deposits), under which 
companies hold exclusive rights to explore, develop, exploit and take title to the production at 
the well-head, in consideration for a royalty and the application of the general taxation 
regime.50 As mentioned above, the FHL was amended in 2014 to create a new type of 
concession: the unconventional exploitation concession. 
 
The procedure for awarding exploration permits and production concessions over new blocks 
(other than those concessions resulting from an exploration permit or a subdivision of an 
existing concession) is by means of a public tender, and the criteria for selecting a bid must be 
the value of the work commitments.51 However, leaving to one side any special cases that may 
involve a bidding process on vacant areas of proven reserves52 and those involving a transfer 
of shares in already existing concessionaires of areas53, an unconventional production 
concession may be acquired through the ownership of (a) an exploration permit or (b) a 
conventional concession, without the need for bidding in either case.54 If this happens, the 
exploitation concessionaire, within the concession area, may require the subdivision of the 
existing area into new areas of unconventional hydrocarbon exploitation and the granting of a 
new Unconventional Exploitation Concession of Hydrocarbons.55 Likewise, holders of an 
unconventional production concession who are, in turn, holders of an adjacent and pre-existing 
conventional concession may request the unification of both areas as a single unconventional 
production concession, “provided that the geological continuity of these areas is clearly 
demonstrated.”56 
 
                                                 
50 See Sections 2, 3 and 6 of Title II of the FHL   
51 Article 45 FHL. 
52 The second paragraph of Article 29 of the Hydrocarbons Law establishes “[t]he Federal or Provincial Executive 
Branch, as the case may be, may […] award exploitation concessions over proven zones to persons who comply 
with the requirements and the proceedings included in Part 5 [Awards] of this Title.” 
53 The first paragraph of Article 72 of the Hydrocarbons Law provides the following: “Concessions and permits 
awarded pursuant to this law may be assigned, with the prior authorization of the Executive Branch, to such 
persons that that qualify and comply with the conditions and requirements established for the concessionaires or 
permit holders, as the case may be.” 
54 See Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Hydrocarbons Law, incorporated by Article 4 of Law 27, 007.  
55 See Article 27 bis of the Hydrocarbons Law. 
56 See Article 27 bis, second paragraph, of the Hydrocarbons Law. 
24 
 
Exploration permits are granted for periods for up to 11 years in respect of conventional on-
shore blocks and 13 years in the case of unconventional on-shore blocks. Periods are divided 
into three phases. In the case of exploration carried out in the Continental Shelf and territorial 
sea, each of the foregoing basic terms for exploration with conventional purpose may be 
increased by one additional year. Work commitments (including drilling commitments) are 
assumed in connection with each phase. Extensions for up to 5 years to be divided between the 
second and third phase are admissible.57  
 
Upon the expiration of each exploration phase (and completion of the respective exploratory 
commitments), the holder of the exploration permit may choose to either withdraw or pursue 
the next phase. However, to enter the next phase, the permit holder must relinquish 50% of the 
remaining acreage covered by the permit.58 If the holder of an exploration permit discovers 
commercially exploitable quantities of oil or gas, the holder may apply for, and is entitled to 
receive, an exclusive concession for the production and the development of such oil and gas.59  
 
A production concession vests in the holder the exclusive right to produce oil and gas, and take 
title to it at the well-head, from the area covered by the concession for a specific term for each 
type of concession (plus, in certain cases, a part of the unexpired portion of the underlying 
exploration permit), which may be extended.60 A production concession also entitles the holder 
to obtain a transportation concession for the oil and gas produced.61 
 
Conventional exploitation concessions are subject to a twenty-five (25) year term, while 
unconventional exploitation concession last for thirty five (35) years – including a Pilot Period 
of up to five (5) years, to be defined by the concessionaire and approved by the Enforcement 
Authority at the time of the initiation of the concession – and off-shore exploitation concessions 
are subject to a thirty (30) year period. 62 
 
In practice, the FHL divides the exploitation phase for unconventional hydrocarbons into two 
phases: first, a “Pilot Period” that may not exceed five years, and second, a “Development 
                                                 
57 See Article 23 FHL. 
58 See Article 26 FHL. 
59 See Article 17 FHL. 
60 See Article 35 FHL. 
61 See Article 28 FHL. 
62 See Article 35 FHL. 
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Period” that (in conjunction with the “Pilot Period”) may extend up to 35 years (plus any 
applicable extension). When the FHL defines “Pilot Project” in its Article 27bis, it establishes 
that “the purpose [of the “Pilot Project”] is to determine the commercial exploitation of the 
discovered field”. In other words, the Pilot Project is needed to confirm (or not) that full scale 
of the unconventional field is commercially feasible. Thus, if the concessionaire decides to 
move to the development phase, it shall have to report to the Province the successful results of 
the Pilot Project. 
 
Finally, art. 35 of the FHL allows holders of exploitation concessions to apply for and obtain 
multiple and unlimited 10-year extensions, provided that: 
• They have complied with their obligations; 
• They are producing hydrocarbons in the relevant block; and  
• They submit an investment plan that is consistent with the development of the 
 concession. 
 
The relevant extension request must be submitted no later than one year prior to the expiration 
of the concession. 
 
Pursuant to the FHL, a 12% royalty payment is required to be made in the jurisdiction in which 
the operations take place.63 Royalties are calculated on the proceeds from the sale of 
hydrocarbons (minus certain discounts reflecting a net-back to the well-head). Payments in 
kind may be negotiated with the respective province. Although payments of royalties are not 
computed because of taxes, they qualify as a deductible expense for income tax purposes.64 
Upon each extension, the royalty rates will increase 3% up to a maximum of 18%.  
  
3.3.2 Midstream Concessions 
If the Vaca Muerta shale oil and gas production is to benefit from the above regulatory regime 
with its special treatment of unconventional resources, it needs to address a different, non-legal 
problem: a bottle neck in existing capacity of gas and crude oil pipelines. 
 
                                                 
63 FHL, Art 59. 
64 Ibid., Art 56(c) VII. 
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In Argentina, the development of pipelines to transport crude oil, natural gas liquids, 
condensate and other liquid by-products from production areas to market is governed by the 
FHL, while the development of natural gas pipelines is governed by the FHL and the Gas Law 
(“GL”). 
 
The legal system conceives the hydrocarbons exploitation concessionaire (liquids and natural 
gas) (also referred as producer or operator) as the “originator” (also referred as “sponsor” or 
“initiator”) of the legal title or license that grants the rights (i) to eminent domain to condemn 
a right of way easement along the proposed route, (ii) to build, operate and maintain the 
pipeline, and (iii) to transport its production up to the market or connection with a main trunk 
pipeline; for a period equivalent to the term of their exploitation concessions (25 or 35 years 
depending on the nature of the concession – conventional or unconventional hydrocarbons-, 
plus potential multiple 10-year extensions). 
 
This means that except as described below, an exploitation concessionaire is the only entity 
entitled to request (and obtain) a “transportation concession”. It is also the only entity entitled 
to a preferential right over the pipeline’s capacity to transport its own hydrocarbons (liquid and 
gas) production, being forced to grant open access to third parties exclusively in respect of any 
vacant capacity. In any case, a transportation concessionaire servicing third parties may only 
charge a regulated tariff established by the State.  
 
An independent midstream company may not request (and obtain) a transportation concession, 
except for two alternatives: (i) winning a public auction in which the State awards a 
transportation concession over a specific route (e.g., the case of the Oldelval pipeline), or (ii) 
acquiring the transportation concession from the exploitation concessionaire by way of an 
assignment agreement duly approved by the State (e.g., the case of the Pacifico pipeline or the 
Atacama pipeline). In both cases, the midstream company shall charge its customers a 
regulated tariff. Further, in these situations the midstream company will not enjoy the 
preferential right that the originator- exploitation concessionaire held at the inception. 
 
However, if, even under those arrangements, midstream companies are willing to invest in 
liquid pipelines, they face a development obstacle. Currently, liquid pipelines operate under a 
“common carrier” system (relatively like the US system that is governed by the Interstate 
Commerce Act). Except for the preferential right of the originator - exploitation 
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concessionaires - for transporting its own production, transportation concessionaires must 
provide a transportation service to any party that reasonably requests service. This means that 
if a pipeline is constrained and a new customer asks for transportation service, the oil pipeline’s 
capacity must be allocated among its customers – including the new customer - and the existing 
customers all lose some of the capacity they otherwise would have had. 
 
In contrast, on a gas pipeline, service is provided to customers on a “contract carriage” basis 
that entitles customers to firm capacity on the pipeline (relatively similar than the US system 
governed by the Natural Gas Act). If a new customer requests service on a constrained gas 
pipeline, the pipeline would not be required to provide service to the new customer. Firm 
contracts are assigned through an Open Season mechanism governed by the GL and stewarded 
by the ENARGAS.  
 
In an approach that contrasts with the US, the State does not require the pipeline to reserve 
some portion of its capacity for allocation among spot or “walk-up” shippers, but instead 
authorizes that 100% of capacity be allocated to committed or contract shippers. Officials at 
the Ministry of Energy and Mining have publicly stated that a new regulation establishing a 
“contract carriage” system for liquid hydrocarbon pipelines coupled with an Open Season 
mechanism will be issued during 2018. If this reform is introduced, it would be well received 
by the oil and gas sector. Without it, project sponsors lack certainty as to the revenue they will 
be able to generate once the pipeline is completed, as well as the service terms that the pipeline 
will be required to offer. 
 
 
3.4 Challenges and Locally Crafted Solutions 
3.4.1 Foreign Influence  
In contrast to the US shale revolution in which the US-based independents led the quest, the 
corporate pioneers in Vaca Muerta were foreign-owned companies, and usually the largest 
internationally operating ones. They also have the leading role on the legal expertise required 
to carry out such a sophisticated project. In July 2017, a joint venture formed by Total, 
Wintershall, Pan American Energy (PAE) and YPF (the state hydrocarbons company) signed 
a multi-project package deal that commits, in aggregate, more than one billion dollars to be 
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invested in three different blocks: Aguada de Castro, Aguada Pichana Este and Aguada Pichana 
Oeste. 
 
The transaction was innovative in several ways: 
• Block split: the parties originally held interests in a historical gas field awarded during 
the early 90s called Aguada Pichana of approximately 338,000 acres. The parties, under 
Total`s operatorship, had mainly developed the eastern side of the block with 
conventional and tight gas projects. To maximize investment and acreage development, 
the parties subdivided the block in two (Aguada Pichana Oeste and Aguada Pichana 
Este). Total continued as operator of the east (approximately 188,000), while PAE 
became operator of the west (approximately 150,000 acres). 
• Horizontal severance: In Aguada Pichana Este, given that the joint venture had already 
de-risked the conventional and tight prospects, the parties agreed a horizontal severance 
of the block. While the conventional and tight gas prospects continue under the existing 
participating interests, the parties will have different interests in the new shale 
prospects. 
• Equity swaps: the parties, in different proportions, had interests in two blocks (Aguada 
de Castro and Aguada Pichana) that were converted in three blocks due to the 
subdivision of the former and, de-facto into four blocks, given the horizontal severance 
of Aguada Pichana Este.  
• Infrastructure usage: with the aim of reducing development costs of non-de-risked 
fields such as Aguada de Castro and Aguada Pichana Oeste and taking advantage of 
infrastructure existing capacity in Aguada Pichana Este, the parties agreed the use of 
the facilities existing in Aguada Pichana Este by the parties developing the Aguada de 
Castro and Aguada Pichana Oeste. 
 
3.4.2 Local Content 
Local content within the oil and gas industry is generally recognized as a form of intervention 
by government that has the aim of ensuring that most of the goods and services required at each 
stage of the oil and gas value chain are locally supplied. In Argentina there is a “Purchase Vaca 
Muerta” (Compre Vaca Muerta), a local content policy designed by the Province of Neuquén 
that requires exploration and production (“E&P”) companies and major service companies with 
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activity in Neuquén to prioritize local suppliers with the aim of boosting local supply chain 
development. 
 
The “Purchase Neuquino”, sets out a local content policy that will accompany the industry’s 
growth. The legal framework for this is composed by: (i) Provincial Law 2,755 dated December 
14, 2010 (“Law 2,755”)65; (ii) Supplementary Decree 2,379 dated December 28, 2012 (“Decree 
2,379”)66; and (iii) the “Proceeding for the Monitoring and Control of Procurement under Law 
2,755” dated June 1, 2014 (the “Proceeding”).67 
 
Enforcement Authority 
The Enforcement Authority of the “Purchase Neuquino” is the Centro PyME-ADENEU,68 
which stands for Center for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises – Agency for the Economic 
Development of Neuquén (Centro de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa – Agencia de Desarrollo 
Económico del Neuquén). The Director is Mr. Facundo Lopez Raggi.69 A key question in the 
near term – and not one that can be answered yet - will be the effectiveness of this body given 
the ambition in the policy itself. 
 
Preference for Local Suppliers 
E&P and major service companies must give preference to local suppliers (“Empresas 
Neuquinas”) when procuring goods and services.70 Such preference must be granted to local 
suppliers (“Empresas Neuquinas”) when their price is lower, equal or a seven per cent (7%) 
higher than the price offered by a non-local supplier, in respect of identical or similar good or 
service.71 
 
                                                 
65 See text in Spanish at http://cvh.cpymeadeneu.com.ar/marcoLegal.php    
66 See text in Spanish at http://cvh.cpymeadeneu.com.ar/pdf/D_2379_2012.PDF    
67 See text in Spanish at http://cvh.cpymeadeneu.com.ar/app/?page=Operadora.Login  
68 See Section 11 of Law 2,755. 
69 See website at http://cvh.cpymeadeneu.com.ar/index.php 
70 See Section 1 of Law 2,755. See also Section 1 of Decree 2,379 that clarifies that the service companies included 
in the “Purchase Neuquino” are those “contractors directly retained” by E&P companies (such as Halliburton, 
Schlumberger, Weatherford, etc.), thus excluding any subcontractors.  
71 See Section 9 of Law 2,755.  
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Such preference is only applicable to a sixty per cent (60%) of the “total contracted amount 
for each category or activity”.72 For instance, if US$ 100,000 were allocated to transportation 
services, a 60% of such amount would be subject to the “priority” established in the “Purchase 
Neuquino”, while the remaining 40% would be freely allocated to non-local suppliers.  
 
The Enforcement Authority has published a chart to exemplify the method it will use for 




If the service or good to be contracted, hired or purchased is indivisible, the priority shall be of 
one hundred per cent (100%).74 If it were to be possible, due to the nature and purpose of the 
relevant good or service, the agreement executed with the local supplier (“Empresa Neuquina”) 
must be in effect for at least one (1) year.75 The Enforcement Authority shall assess the 
                                                 
72 This is the official criterion of the Enforcement Authority for assessing the fulfillment of the mandatory 60% 
(see Section 4.3.2., ¶1, when it states that “el monitoreo y seguimiento de la aplicación de las prioridades de 
contratación se efectuará sobre el total del monto contratado para cada uno de los rubros o tipo de actividades 
requeridas”). However, it is worth noting that, when determining the base for assessing the fulfillment of the 
mandatory 60%, Section 8 of Law 2,755 refers to the “totality of the contracted services and goods” (in Spanish: 
“Este sesenta por ciento (60%) sera tomado del total de los servicios o bienes por los cuales se contrata”).   
73 This chart was published at page 7 of the Proceeding, accessed at the following website:  
http://cvh.cpymeadeneu.com.ar/app/upload/operadora/PG_CPYME_PHC_02_Monitoreo_de_aplicacion_Opera
doras_y_Servicios_C_Rev_00.pdf. The term “ESSN” stands for a local supplier that it is in the process of 
obtaining the certificate of “empresa neuquina”. 
74 See Section 8 of Decree 2,379.  
75 See Section 10 of Law 2,755. See also Section 10 of Decree 2,379.  
31 
 
fulfillment of the mandatory 60% on the basis of yearly periods beginning in January 1st and 
ending in December 31st of each year.76 
 
Categories 
The Enforcement Authority has included the following categories within the “Purchase 
Neuquino”:77 
1) Oil Services on the field; 
2) Civil Engineering and Works; 
3) Electro-mechanic Engineering and Works; 
4) Transportation Services; 
5) Metal-mechanic Engineering, Works and Goods; 
6) IT and communications; 
7) Maintenance of service stations; 
8) Environmental services; 
9) Consulting services, and 
10) Other services.  
 
Excluded Goods and Services 
Due to a lack of their availability in the Province of Neuquén, the Enforcement Authority has 
excluded the following goods and services from the “Purchase Neuquino”:78 
Category (1): Oil Services on the field 
➢ Seismic services 
➢ Underbalance drilling services 
➢ Well-head services 
➢ Cementing services 
➢ Cementing and stimulation services 
➢ Coiled tubing services 
➢ Services with automatic drilling equipment 
➢ Services with drilling rigs  
➢ Work-over services 
                                                 
76 See Section 4.4.1 of the Proceeding.  
77 See Section 4.2 of the Proceeding.  
78 See Section 4.3.2.1 of the Proceeding.  
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➢ Stimulation services 
➢ Supply of drilling/completion fluids 
➢ Supply of special products on field (chemicals, proppants, sand, cementing 
products, etc.) (to be assessed depending on the product) 
➢ Treatment of waste 
➢ Well logging and casing services 
➢ Directional drilling services 
➢ Heat tracing services 
➢ Top drive services 
 
Category (3): Electro-mechanic Engineering and Works 
➢ Maintenance of power generators 
➢ Maintenance of real-time operating systems (RTOS) 
➢ Operating and maintenance of gas plants 
 
Category (4): Transportation Services 
➢ Air transportation 
 
Category (5): Metal-mechanic Engineering, Works and Goods 
➢ Repair service of turbo-compressors (to be assessed on a case-by-case basis) 
➢ Maintenance and repair of valves (to be assessed on a case-by-case basis) 
➢ Operation and maintenance of pumping stations 
 
Category (10): Other Services 
➢ Supply of satellite television 
➢ Supply of grid power 
➢ Supply of gas compression services 
 
The budget allocated by E&P and large service companies to the excluded goods and services 
does not count for purposes of assessing the mandatory 60%.79 For instance, if the budget for 
E&P is US$ 50 million and US$ 45 million are allocated to the excluded goods and services, 
only the remaining US$ 5 million allocated to goods and services included in the “Purchase 
                                                 
79 See Section 4.4 of the Proceeding.  
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Neuquino” will count for assessing the mandatory 60%. Therefore, US$ 3 million should be 
allocated to local suppliers. 
 
Beneficiaries (“Empresas Neuquinas”) 
The “Purchase Neuquino” benefits local suppliers (individuals or legal entities) who complied 
with certain requirements to qualify as an “empresa neuquina”, including:80 
o The domicile and main seat of business must be located in the Province of Neuquén 
for five (5) years before the enactment of Law 2,755 (i.e., December 2005).  
o A seventy per cent (70%) of the capital stock must be owned by individuals or legal 
entities domiciled or registered in Neuquén. In the case of joint ventures, a 70% 
of it must be controlled by a local supplier. 
 
Any local company directly or indirectly controlled by national or foreign companies will not 
qualify as a local supplier (“empresa neuquina”).81 To enjoy the benefits of the “Purchase 
Neuquino”, local suppliers must submit before E&P companies and major service companies 
a certificate issued by the Enforcement Authority that expressly qualifies the local supplier as 
an “empresa neuquina”. Such certificate must be renewed on a yearly basis.82 
  
Reporting Obligations 
The Enforcement Authority may request to the E&P companies and major service companies’ 
information and documentation, or conduct audits, regarding their fulfillment of the “Purchase 
Neuquino”.83 E&P companies and major service companies must report to the Enforcement 
Authority any call for bids for the award of a contract, work or service. The Enforcement 
Authority may publish those calls for bids in its website.84 
 
Penalties 
Any company not complying with a requirement of the Enforcement Authority shall be warned. 
If the breach is not cured, the Enforcement Authority may establish a fine ranging from US$ 
                                                 
80 See Section 5 of Law 2,755. See also Section 5 of Decree 2,379.  
81 See Section 6 of Law 2,755. See also Section 6 of Decree 2,379.  
82 See Section 7 of Law 2,755. See also Section 7 of Decree 2,379.  
83 See Section 12 of Decree 2,379. See also Section 4.4.1 of the Proceeding.  
84 See Section 16 of Law 2,755.  
34 
 
7,000 and US$ 60,000, upon conducting an administrative proceeding that guarantees the right 
of defense of the company.85 If the company does not reach the mandatory 60%, it may submit 
before the Enforcement Authority a plan detailing the objectives and points of action to be 
implemented in order to fulfill with the “Purchase Neuquino”.86 
 
3.5 Assessment 
To replicate at least some of the US shale experience in Argentina, the case study demonstrates 
that specific legal instruments have been introduced, especially in the concession arrangements 
but also in terms of the ambitious and highly detailed local content policy, clearly aimed at 
building up a services sector. The location of the main shale plays away from densely populated 
areas is no doubt a factor in their rapid development to date. The ‘social licence to operate’ has 
not been a major concern in these areas. Building on its promising geology, Argentina has 
made considerable effort in its recent law and policy to provide credible legal and economic 
stability to investors. The plethora of instruments and incentives provides an encouraging 
setting for investment promotion, leading to a future reversal of the decline in oil and gas 
production and a recovery of Argentina’s energy independence.  
  
                                                 
85 See Section 19 of Law 2,755. See also Section 19 of Decree 2,379. 
86 See Section 4.6 of the Proceeding.  
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4. Case Study 2: Colombia 
4.1 Reacting to Shale 1.0 
The development of the unconventional hydrocarbons industry in the US, and its success in 
terms of the rapid increase of production that allowed it to become self-sufficient after decades 
of being a net importer, attracted considerable attention in Colombia. 
Evidence of suitable geology and possible reserves was already there. According to the US 
Energy Information Administration, the Colombian territory holds two formations (La Luna 
and Guachetá) that share features and other similarities with the Eagle Ford shale play in 
Texas87, one of the most productive formations of unconventional hydrocarbons in the United 
States88. 
 
Estimated reserves of Colombia are around 55 TCF of shale gas and 6.8 billion barrels of shale 
oil, located in the areas with better potential for the development of shale gas and oil resources. 
To stimulate interest in shale resources, a bid round was held in 201289 in which the government 
offered 12 areas located over plays with new prospectivity, and 18 areas on frontier plays where 
the geological knowledge was very limited. The result was the licensing of five areas of the 
former, but none of the later. In addition, the government included a tax incentive for 
unconventional hydrocarbons, under which the royalty to be paid over the production of 
unconventional resources is only 60% of the rate for conventional oil production90. This round 
signalled the beginning of government actions to promote unconventional hydrocarbons 
resources. 
 
                                                 
87 U.S. Energy Information Administration. Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An 
Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside of the United States. U.S. Department of Energy. 
Junes 2013. 
88 U.S. Energy Information Administration. Drilling Productivity Report for key tight oil and gas regions. March 
2015. 
89 NHA. Term of reference for Colombia Round 2012. Available at: http://www.anh.gov.co/Asignacion-de-
areas/Procedimientos-de-
Seleccion/Procesos%20Anteriores/Ronda%20Colombia%202012/Terms%20of%20Reference-
%20Addendum%20No.%204%20English%20translation.pdf (last visited:  March 1th, 2018). 
90 Law 1530 of 2012. Article 14. 
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4.2 The Legal and Policy Framework 
Under Article 332 of the Constitution, ownership of the subsoil and all non-renewable natural 
resources lies with the State. Under certain conditions, private parties may explore for and 
produce hydrocarbons however, subject to grant of rights in the form of a concession and 
payment of royalties. The rules for hydrocarbons activities are set out in national laws, 
regulations and in the terms of concessions granted to applicants from time to time. 
A hydrocarbons policy emerged in the 1990s as a response to instability in the country’s energy 
supply. Due to the El Niño phenomenon, the supply of electricity was adversely affected by a 
drought that left the country with constant blackouts for almost a year91. This drew attention to 
the fundamental role that energy played in the daily functioning of the country, and as a driver 
of its future development. At the time, Colombia was heavily dependent upon hydroelectric 
power (in 1992 it amounted to 78% of the installed capacity), and given the risks associated 
with such supply and climate-related events this put the country in a very risky position92. 
Among other measures taken by the government to lessen this risk, the diversification of 
primary energy sources led to the investment and development of fossil fuel-powered 
generation plants. Ironically, while Colombia is one of the largest exporters of coal, most of 
the plants built for this purpose used gas as the source of electricity generation. 
This situation provided an impetus to the identification of indigenous supplies of oil and gas, 
which eventually led to important discoveries during the 1990´s that in turn allowed a constant 
supply of petroleum. This covered the local demand for gas and increased the resources of the 
government through revenues from oil exports93. In 2006 the government issued a national 
energy policy document (National Energy Plan 2006-202594), in which it stated the need to 
continue the process of diversification of primary energy sources. This included the need to 
increase the rate of exploration drilling, as well as the potential need to build a regasification 
terminal on the coast. Energy security was the dominant concern and increasing the supply of 
hydrocarbons was a key element in ensuring energy security. 
                                                 
91 Mateus, A.C. Energy Crisis in Colombia. Tecnología, investigación y Academia. Vol. 4. No. 2. 2016  
92 UPME. Study to determine the vulnerability and adaptation option of the Colombian energy sector to face 
climate change. December 2013. Page. 68. 
93 UPME. Boletín Estadístico de Minas y Energía. 2005. Pages 22 and 30.  
94 UPME. Plan Energético Nacional. 2006-2025. 2006 
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These measures have ensured a diversification of the energy matrix. By 2012, 69.9% of the 
electricity in Colombia was generated by hydro-powered sources, 24.8% by gas-powered 
sources, and 4.9% by coal-powered sources95. However, there was still a need to develop 
additional supply sources of hydrocarbons to continue supporting the economy, in case of a 
recurrence of extreme climate patterns such as the deterioration attributable to the El Niño 
phenomenon. 
Nonetheless, the hydrocarbons reserves bear no comparison with those of its neighbour, 
Venezuela. Hydrocarbons have become a part of the Colombian economy but are not central 
to it. Foreign companies have long been present, and several contractual systems have been 
applied, including the service contract as early as 1951, and later an association contract until 
200396. 
At the beginning of the 2000s, the hydrocarbons sector was in decline and needed a dramatic 
restructuring if it was to survive. As of 1999, the estimated reserves of hydrocarbons appeared 
likely to supply the needs of the economy for the next four years, and the number of exploratory 
wells was a mere ten in the year 2002; despite this, the government take was as high as 82%97. 
Changes implemented by the government included the partial privatization of the NOC (10% 
of its shares), the transfer of regulatory capacity to an independent regulatory body (the 
National Hydrocarbons Agency, or NHA), as well as a substantial reduction in the government 
take. By implementing law-decree 1760 of 2003, the government separated out the activities 
of the NOC (also known as Ecopetrol). It focused Ecopetrol’s operations on exploration and 
production, while passing regulatory powers to the NHA. In addition, the contractual system 
changed from an association contract to a modern concession system. Two primary types of 
concession contract were used: a Technical Evaluation Agreement was created to incentivize 
the investor to carry out exploration activities, and an Exploration and Production Contract was 
created to incentivize the final exploration and a more concrete phase of hydrocarbon 
production98.  
Under this new concession model, the participation of the government or the NOC was limited 
to its regulatory role. They therefore did not participate in any exploration or commercial 
                                                 
95 UPME. Study of electricity generation under a scenario of climate change. 2012. 
96 Perry, G and Olivera, M.  El Petróleo en la Economía Colombiana. Petróleo ¿bendición o maldición? 2012. 
Page 176. 
97 Ibid. Page 181. 
98 NHA. Agreement 008 of 2004. 
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decision-making. In addition, this new model entitled the investor to the full rights of 
production, after the payment of tax and royalties99.  
The results of the implementation of the abovementioned changes had a direct impact on the 
oil and gas sector in Colombia. Exploratory activity increased, and in 2003 alone there were 
28 new A3 wells drilled – five of them with successful results. In addition, seismic exploration 
also increased to 3,470 km in the same year100.   
Regulatory stimuli and favourable international prices thus combined to power the 
hydrocarbons sector in Colombia. After 2003, companies from Europe, North America and 
Asia decided to invest in the prospects offered by the government. Due to the increased 
investments and the continuous efforts from the private and public sectors, production of oil in 
Colombia increased from 528 thousand barrels a day in 2004 to 786 thousand a day in 2010. 
At the peak point of production in 2013, over one million barrels per day were produced101.   
The improvement in production also reflected a sustained increase in foreign direct investment, 
as the oil and gas sector jumped from USD 278 million in foreign direct investment in 2003 to 
over USD 5.4 billion in 2012102. Additionally, the income of royalties received by the 
Colombian government between 2010 and 2014 had an increase of 40%, demonstrating a 
correlation between the progress of the energy sector and the additional sources of funding for 
the government103.  
However, the boom in commodity prices, especially with respect to hydrocarbons, began 
slowing down in 2014. The oil and gas industry in Colombia was faced with the need to 
restructure to maintain the levels of production and exploration. The answer came from the 
independent regulatory body, the NHA, which became more flexible with respect to contractual 
deadlines, among other measures. The NHA also allowed the option of transferring investment 
                                                 
99 UPME. La Cadena del Petróleo en Colombia. 2005. Page 28. 
100 UPME. La Cadena del Petróleo en Colombia. 2005. Page 30. 
101 PWC. Colombia Oil & Gas Industry 2014. 2014. 
102 Colombian Central Bank. Statistics on Fluctuations of Foreign Direct Investment per Sector. Available at: 
http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/inversion-directa 
Last visited:  March 1th, 2018. 
103 Natural Resource Governance Institute. Los Efectos del Boom de las industrias Extractivas en los 
Indicadores Sociales en Colombia. August. 2016. 
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commitments from certain exploration programmes to others that were on the license, or to 
other licenses granted to the same company104. 
This situation affected the finances of the Colombian government, which decided to carry out 
a tax reform to compensate for the decline in revenues it was receiving from oil and gas 
production105. Despite the abovementioned measures taken by the Colombian government to 
maintain levels of production, sustain the rate of foreign investment and stabilize the conditions 
of the market, the fall in the price of oil affected the industry negatively and its activity began 
to decline. According to a report from a fiscal agency within the Colombian government, the 
lack of exploration and the low price of hydrocarbons indicated that the country could become 
a net importer of oil as early as 2021106. 
Ecopetrol (the NOC) has had success in several areas of exploration, but the rate of these 
findings is not sufficiently high to compensate for the replacement of reserves. This 
replacement of reserves is needed for Colombia to regain control over its own security of 
supply on hydrocarbons. As a result, the policy choice of encouraging exploration of 
unconventional hydrocarbons gained traction. A debate began about whether such oil and gas 
formations should be developed or not. For some, shale resources appeared to be one attractive 
way of tackling the issues outlined above. 
 
4.3 Regulating to Promote Unconventional Hydrocarbons 
The National Council for Social and Economic Policy is the highest authority for policy 
decisions in Colombia. In 2008 it issued a document where it recommended establishing 
technical guidelines for the exploration and production of unconventional hydrocarbons. It also 
recommended the design of legal tools and a model contract that could be utilized when taking 
decisions based on the technical guidelines107. This document was the first public document 
                                                 
104 NHA. Agreement No. 02 of the 16th of March 2015. 
105 Justification of Tax Reform 2016. Available at: 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/co/Documents/tax/Exposición%20de%20Motivos%20Reforma
%20Estructural%202016.pdf (last visited: March 1th, 2018). 
106 Contraloría General de la República. Autosuficiencia petrolera en Colombia. Macro-Sectorial Bulletin No. 6. 
May 2017. 
107 Document CONPES 3517 of May 12th, 2008.  
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that the Colombian Government issued regarding shale resources, and it was the first official 
sign of an intention to develop them. 
In 2012, the Ministry of Mines and Energy issued a resolution where it established the 
procedures for the exploration and production of unconventional hydrocarbons. The resolution 
referred to the first technical requirements for exploration, such as seismic information, the 
decommissioning of exploratory wells, and requirements to commence a production well. 
Additionally, the resolution includes a procedure to be utilized if two lawful license-holders, 
who have the right to explore and exploit the natural resources underground, have interests in 
the same areas and face a conflict on who can exploit the resource. According to the Colombian 
government, it is required that the parties begin a negotiation and each present action plans to 
solve the conflict, as well as provide a technical basis for a better exploitation of the 
underground resources. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy will appoint an expert (from a group of experts nominated by the parties) who will 
decide from a technical perspective which party has the best possibility of optimizing the 
exploitation of the resources108. This unique situation provides a way to solve, for example, a 
conflict between a titleholder for a coalmine that is in the production phase, and a potential 
license holder that may be interested in exploiting Coalbed Methane reserves that are in the 
same area.  
In 2014, several technical and contractual developments occurred that improved the prospects 
of the unconventional hydrocarbons industry in Colombia. The NHA produced a model 
Exploration and Production contract that included modifications reflecting the particularities 
of unconventional hydrocarbon resources. For example, the exploration period was extended 
from 6 to 9 years, the period for the program of evaluation was extended from 2 to 4 years, and 
the production period was extended from 24 to 30 years. Regarding the relinquishment of land, 
it allowed the licensee the right to maintain 50% of the areas that have been assigned under the 
license if they present a new exploratory programme109.  
 
The contractual process was also modified, and the financial and technical requirements for the 
development of unconventional hydrocarbons were raised according to the type of activity and 
                                                 
108 Ministry of Mines Resolution 180742 of 2012. 
109 Brigard & Urrutia. Boletin Legal. 19TH Edition, 2014. 
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the area that would be explored. In general, all requirements were stricter for the concessionaire 
than those applicable to a conventional hydrocarbons project110. 
 
In the same year, the Ministry of Mines and Energy issued special regulations for the 
exploration and production of unconventional hydrocarbons. This new directive was very 
detailed with respect to the procedures and technical specifications for the construction of 
wells, particularly in the areas where underground water sources may be located111. 
 
The regulations covered the areas illustrated in Table 3.1: 
 
Table 3.1: Content of Regulations on Unconventional Hydrocarbons E&P 
 
Subject  Measures  
Plan for previous use of hydraulic 
fracturing 
1. The superficial coating must be cemented 
up to the surface. 
2. The cementing process that must be used 
is pumping and sealing or a similar one 
that allows settling of the cement. 
3.  Superficial coat must be built to a depth 
not less than 150 feet under any acquirer 
that could be used for human 
consumption. 
4. It is necessary to carry out pressure test to 
the casing and dementing. 
5. In case there is any problem with 
cementing or casing, it must be reported 
to the authorities, the activities must be 
suspended immediately  
Use of Hydraulic Fracturing 1. Complete schedule of fracturing activity. 
                                                 
110 NHA.Agreement 03. March 2014. 
111 Ministry of Mines. Resolution 90341 of March 2014. 
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2. Volumes used for the fracture, chemical 
agents present in the mixture, and 
anticipated pressures of fracture. 
3. Radius of the hydraulic stimulation for 
every stage. 
4. Baseline of natural radioactive present in 
the local environment, and potential 
measures taken in case of its increase. 
5. A program of hydraulic stimulation that 
includes the high of the casing and 
cementing, and an analysis that shows 
that the cementing and casing will be able 
to resist the pressures caused by the 
stimulation. 
Use of Hydraulic Fracturing 1. Execute pressure test over the casing that 
may be expose to any hydraulic 
fracturing activity. 
2. The operator must be permanently 
monitoring the pressure, and if it reaches 
a limit112, the operation must be 
immediately stopped. 
3. In case of a leak within the pipes and the 
casing, the activity must be stopped, and 
the authorities must be notified to act. 
4. The regulation establishes a formula to 
determine the minimum depth from 
aquifers allowed to perform hydraulic 
fracturing. 
• Hydraulic fracturing cannot be done 
within less than 200 meters of an 
underground aquifer source of water for 
agriculture or human consumption. 
                                                 
112 200 psi. 
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Re-injection of produced water 1. A general assessment of the geological 
formation. 
2. The measures and pressures of the lateral 
drilling and fractures of the well. 
3. Historic seismicity evidence within 16 
km of the location of the well. 
Activities that require previous 
authorization by the Ministry of Mines 
• Beginning of construction of the well. 
• Cementing and casing. 
• Test of the preventers. 
• Test of casing and cementing. 
• Pressure tests. 
 
The abovementioned regulations refer to key issues that have been at the heart of the technical 
controversy over shale gas in the United States and can be seen as providing a basis to respond 
positively to environmental concerns about the production of shale resources. 
In the same year - 2014 - the Ministry of Environment issued the terms of reference for the 
environmental impact assessment for unconventional hydrocarbons113, with very specific 
requirements addressing the new situations and potential risks that the new techniques could 
bring. Amongst them were: 
• The need to include studies about the underground water sources, its geological 
features, direction of the flow of water, connection with other aquifers, and condition 
for human consumption of the liquid. 
• The need to inform the authorities about the location of aquifers, permeability of the 
stratigraphic formations, including any faults or fractures that are present. 
• It is required to prepare a baseline study on quality of air, including the monitoring and 
presence of carbon monoxide, methane, among others. 
• The need to disclose the products that will be used on the fracturing liquid, including 
the name of the chemical product as it is known in the market, and its purpose on the 
fluid in the chemical substance is under any recognized trade secret, the chemical 
general family must be included. 
                                                 




4.4 Challenges and Locally Crafted Solutions 
4.4.1 Foreign Influence in the regulatory developments in Colombia 
By 2012 the authorities had decided to consider the potential risks and benefits of developing 
unconventional hydrocarbons in Colombia in greater detail, considering experiences from 
other countries with more technical knowledge, as well as international bodies such as the 
Commission of the European Union. On an informed basis, it then proposed to take a decision 
to support this innovative technology and its use in Colombia or not. 
 
The study was divided into four (4) phases: (i) consultation and advice from renowned 
international experts; (ii) field visits from the highest authorities to the blocks and areas where 
shale gas had been developing; (iii) meetings with regulators and technical authorities of the 
countries and states that have allowed the technology to be used in their areas, and next, (iv) a 
final decision would be taken. 
 
The first phase included the invitation of experts that had been advising the American 
government on fracking and its development. These experts advised the personnel of the four 
institutions that would potentially be involved in the regulation of any activity related to 
fracking114. Fourteen (14) different experts, with both positive and negative views on the use 
of fracking, were invited to share their knowledge and opinions with the staff of the authorities. 
This process was designed to allow the decision-makers, their support staff, and particularly 
the people that would have to deal with the events on a day-to-day basis, to have a better 
understanding of the technology, the risks and the benefits that fracking could bring. 
 
The second phase included the visit of officers from the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the 
Ministry of Environment to British Columbia and to Texas, principally to the zone where the 
Eagle Ford formation is located. This allowed them to see and experience at first hand the 
development and activity that was carried on there, and to evaluate the reality of a production 
area.  
 
                                                 
114 The institutions are: The Ministry of Mines and Energy, The Ministry of Environment, The National 
Hydrocarbons Regulator, and the Authority on Environmental Licenses. 
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The visits also coincided with several meetings with regulatory bodies from Colorado, Texas, 
Pennsylvania, Alberta and British Columbia. These meetings helped the officers to understand 
from a technical point of view115, drawing upon the experience of those states and provinces, 
how the industry had developed, how the regulations were able to reduce risks, and how the 
operations had been carried out in those areas116. 
 
The result was that these efforts produced the technical regulations for the exploration and 
production of unconventional hydrocarbons, the terms of reference for the environmental 
impact assessments required for the environmental licenses, and the modification of the 
standard concession contract that allows for exploration and production of oil and gas in the 
country. 
 
The comparative aspect of the study, drawing upon experiences and advice from regulators and 
policy experts from countries and areas where the boom has occurred, were essential in 
developing the regulatory framework in Colombia. Extrapolating from the experiences of the 
United States, the need for baseline studies on the geology of the area, the location of aquifers 
and the potential for tremors and seismic activity became clear. This information is now 
required by the Colombian authorities – an example of how the regulatory processes from other 
jurisdictions has influenced the substantive regulatory process in Colombia. 
  
Another example of how North American experiences have shaped the regulatory process in 
Colombia is the increase in financial and technical requirements for companies that are 
interested in developing unconventional resources. Experience in the US and Canada has 
shown the need for profound technical knowledge, skill and capacity to manage the complex 
requirements of fracking and horizontal drilling. It is also necessary to have substantial 
financial capacity to fund such a capital- and time-intensive operation, and especially to be able 
to demonstrate this capacity in the event of unforeseen issues. Therefore, the increases in 
requirements show how the Colombian authorities have learnt from foreign experiences and 
used this knowledge in crafting their own regulations. 
 
                                                 
115 The Colombian Government also attempted to contact the French authorities to understand their reticence 
about fracking. However, there was no response, and the French experience and point of view was not heard by 
the Colombian government. 
116 Bermúdez, A. Así nació la hoja de ruta para el fracking. Lasillavacia.com. September 2014. 
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4.4.2 Overlapping Claims   
Concern about overlapping locations of interest between conventional and unconventional 
hydrocarbons licensees seems to be a constant feature of the Colombian framework117. The 
current regulations provide different options for companies that may find themselves in this 
position. 
On the one hand, the abovementioned procedure for the solution of disputes between licensees 
with a conflict regarding who may develop a specific hydrocarbon or mineral resource and how 
to develop it appears to be a new stage in the regulation of shale resources. However, the 
regulation also allows another option, where the holder of an unconventional licence is 
encouraged to create a team or consortium with a licensee that already has conventional 
resources under development. With this approach, a new company could develop the area for 
the conventional resources in place as well as for unconventional resources that may also be 
there. This approach clearly makes effective use of the infrastructure currently in place, which 
may have already been developed with the local community and have the technical features 
and information already obtained by the previous licensee on the ground. 
While conflicting interests in areas of exploration are evidently a persistent feature of 
hydrocarbons activity in Colombia, the regulators have been able to create pathways to develop 
both conventional and unconventional resources – both of which are useful to improve the 
security of supply for the country. 
 
4.5 Assessment 
The hydrocarbons industry plays a key role in the economy of Colombia, due to the large 
foreign investment it attracts and the income it generates for the government of a developing 
country. However, as this country study demonstrates, extensive measures have been taken to 
adapt it to changed circumstances, notably in 2003 and again to introduce a regime for 
unconventional hydrocarbons development. The latter contains several features of note: a 
distinct regulatory regime, and wide-ranging public consultations on its design; steps to ensure 
                                                 
117 For a comprehensive discussion of this subject see the LLM Thesis by Jorge E Arango Camacho, Colombian 
Legislation on Unconventional Hydrocarbons, University of Dundee (2015). 
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that conventional and unconventional activity is harmonised from a regulatory point of view. 
An interesting gap is that local content requirements appear to be absent from the Colombian 
regime for shale gas resources, and no distinct local content policy is evident.  
If one looks beyond the hydrocarbons sector, there are three macroeconomic or social factors 
that are likely to influence the future development of shale resources. Firstly, while Colombia 
has made substantial progress in the peaceful solution of its internal armed conflict by signing 
a peace agreement with F.A.R.C., other guerrilla groups such as a body called the E.L.N. 
continue to engage in terrorist activity and target the vulnerable hydrocarbons transport 
infrastructure. Secondly, local communities have begun to mobilise themselves to oppose 
projects involving the extractive industries (particularly mining projects), using electoral tools 
that may allow them to legally prohibit extracting activities on their land, adding doubt to 
investors seeking a social license to operate on Colombian territory. Finally, the economic and 
financial viability of petroleum production is challenged due to high lifting and transportation 
costs.  
However, the possibility that Colombia may in the foreseeable future have to commence 
imports of hydrocarbons from its neighbours or from other countries is an option that many 
policymakers and private sector leaders see as ‘of last resort’. Therefore, there seems to be a 
consensus emerging for the need to make a renewed effort at developing unconventional 
hydrocarbons. The need to increase the reserves, and to replace the income for the central 
government, seems to be driving informed opinion towards the development of shale resources. 
Nevertheless, there is strong opposition from a different (and still informed) constellation of 
environmental groups, local communities and academics. This is likely to require a new policy 




5. Case Study 3: United Kingdom 
5.1 Reacting to Shale 1.0 
The emergence of an unconventional hydrocarbon industry was kick-started in the UK by the 
interest of policy-makers in the rapid development of unconventional resources across the 
Atlantic and the evident economic benefits this brought to the US economy. For some in the 
UK, this seemed to be a ‘game-changer’, occurring fortuitously at a time when the UK’s 
revenues from North Sea oil and gas were in decline and import dependency was on the rise. 
In 2016, only 43% of UK gas requirements were met from UK production and 57% were 
imported from outside the UK – 44% from European pipelines and 13% from LNG tankers. In 
other words, the UK imports more gas than it produces, and by the start of 2017 gas production 
was no more than a third of the peak level recorded in 2000.118  
 
The speed with which Shale 1.0 appeared to transform the US energy economy acted as a 
stimulus to UK policy development with the goal of replicating the US success even if on a 
smaller scale. In this Case Study we examine how the existing regulatory regime for 
conventional hydrocarbons was initially modified, and then supplemented by a series of 
specific legal measures aimed at promoting unconventional resource exploration and 
development.  
* * * 
 
An initial lack of knowledge of the geological potential was boosted by several studies, most 
notably by the UK Government and the British Geological Society (BGS).119 Shale beds are 
not found all over the UK. In England the most promising areas were quickly identified in 
several studies: the Bowland-Hodder study of June 2013; the Weald Basin study of May 2014 
and in Scotland, the Midland Valley of Scotland study of June 2014.120 These reports and the 
wider DECC-BGS report supported the view that shale gas reserves could be significant. 
However, one report noted: “The untested shale rock volume in the UK is very large; however, 
                                                 
118 BEIS, 2017. Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES) 2016 – Chapter 4: natural Gas 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/632523/Chapter_4.pdf>  
119 BGS, 2018. Shale gas <http://www.bgs.ac.uk/research/energy/shaleGas/home.html> See also the BEIS 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations#department-for-business-energy-and-industrial-strategy Other 
studies were carried out: for example, Shale Gas Extraction in the UK: A Review of Hydraulic Fracturing (2012), 
The Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering; Independent Expert Scientific Panel – Report on 
Unconventional Oil and Gas (2014), The Scottish Government. 




more drilling, fracture stimulating, and production testing is necessary to prove that shale gas 
development is technically and economically viable. Even if one assumes that the American 
shale gas producing analogies are valid, many of the operating conditions are different in the 
UK”.121 There was therefore some uncertainty about the results. Uncertainty about technically 
recoverable reserves of shale gas and oil was further supported by a 2012 report from the UK 
Energy Research Centre (UKERC).122 Despite this, the UK Government has repeatedly 
affirmed in policy statements that shale gas could materially contribute to the UK’s energy 
security and offer economic benefits, a position unsurprisingly supported by companies heavily 
involved in the UK shale gas sector. Its estimates have been criticised as over-optimistic by the 
BGS.123  
 
5.2 The Legal and Policy Framework 
The framework for energy policy in the UK is more complex than in many countries, with 
shared competencies distributed across international, national and sub-national tiers of 
government.124 As a Member State of the EU (and for some years after its withdrawal), the UK 
must comply with EU law, including its legislation on energy, health and safety and 
environment. In these areas however, competences are often shared or left to the national rather 
than the EU level125. Within the UK, a devolved structure operates so that certain legislative 
powers reside in separate structures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Under this 
arrangement, legislative powers are separated into ‘reserved’ matters remaining under the full 
jurisdiction of the UK and devolved matters are placed within the jurisdiction of the devolved 
countries.  
 
                                                 
121 DECC, 2013. Unconventional Hydrocarbon Resources of Britain’s Onshore Basins – Shale Gas 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/367287/Shalegas_uk.pdf> p.32. 
122 UKREC, 2012. A review of regional and global estimates of unconventional gas resources – September 2012 
<http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/asset/A72A2DC5-B646-41C2-B392B8F552246C5A/>  
123 Cuadrilla, 2016. About Natural Gas <http://www.cuadrillaresources.com/what-we-do/about-natural-gas/>  
124 Department for Trade and Industry, 2007. Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Energy – May 
2007 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243268/7124.pdf>  
125 An exception is the Recommendation adopted by the European Commission on 22 January 2014 on 
safeguarding principles that Member States should implement to regulate shale gas operations. This is not legally 
binding. It sets out as minimum requirements the following: a requirement for operators to carry out a risk 
assessment and a baseline environmental study before they start operations; a requirement that operators provide 
a financial guarantee or equivalent that covers their obligations under permits and potential liabilities for 
environmental damage; and a requirement for a survey to be made after each installation’s closure to compare the 
environmental condition of the site with its pre-operational state as set out in the baseline study. 
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In energy terms, the effect of the above structure is that the UK authorities have reserved 
powers over the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity; the ownership, 
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon deposits; coal (including its ownership and 
exploitation) and nuclear energy and nuclear installations. Devolved matters include powers 
over related areas such the environment, planning and some economic development, including 
fiscal powers. It is worth noting that dividing responsibilities between the UK and devolved 
governments in this way has not led to a clear separation of powers in practice.126  
 
At the national level, it is the UK as the sovereign state that holds key responsibilities for 
meeting international (e.g. the Paris Agreement) and EU (e.g. the 2009 Renewable and Climate 
Change Directive) commitments. As such, it is the UK Government, primarily through the 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS)127 and the UK Treasury, that 
designs the wider electricity market and the main policy instruments to promote several types 
of energy (e.g. renewables, nuclear, shale gas). They also hold oversight responsibility for 
regulating both the energy sector and energy networks via the Office for Gas and Electricity 
Markets (OFGEM), a pan-UK independent energy regulatory body alongside other bodies 
including the Crown Estate and National Grid. It is also the UK Government that participates 
directly in negotiations at the international level on the direction of current and future energy 
relevant policy.128 Other agencies play a role in unconventional resource development. Two 
require mention. The Environment Agency is the environmental regulator for all onshore oil 
and gas operations in England, including: Shale gas; Coal bed methane; and Underground coal 
gasification. Following devolution in 1997, there have been several changes to the institutional 
and regulatory landscape in the devolved administrations. Since the Offshore Safety Act 1992, 
health and safety has not been a factor BEIS checks when considering the competence of an 
operator. This is wholly the responsibility of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), an 
independent regulator, responsible for enforcing health and safety legislation in workplaces. It 
is responsible for enforcing health and safety laws.   
 
                                                 
126 Wood, Geoffrey and Baker, Keith. A Critical Review of Scottish Renewable and Low Carbon Energy Policy. 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 
127 Newly established in 2016, BEIS incorporates energy issues from the now defunct Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC). 
128 Wood, Geoffrey and Baker, Keith. A Critical Review of Scottish Renewable and Low Carbon Energy Policy. 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 
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The above complex structure has given rise to concerns that there is a ‘regulatory maze’ which 
could act as a deterrent to new investors. For that reason, the UK Government has issued 
guidance notes for investors about how to address matters such as applications for planning 
consents.   
 
5.3 Regulating to Promote Unconventional Hydrocarbons 
5.3.1 Adaptation of the Existing Licensing Regime 
In regulatory terms, unconventional energy has been developed to date as a sub-set of the 
established regime for conventional hydrocarbons. Although a pragmatic choice, this implicitly 
set to one side the distinct features of unconventional resource development. The starting point 
is that in the UK, as in most countries, ownership of underground hydrocarbons is vested in 
the State, or in this case the Crown. Responsibility for managing the sector lies with the 
Secretary of State for Energy. His department – the BIES129 - is responsible for setting energy 
policy and establishing the framework for achieving policy goals. BEIS is responsible for 
petroleum licensing of onshore and offshore activities, including decommissioning of oil and 
gas installations and pipelines, as well as enforcing environmental legislation. The department 
has set up the Office for Unconventional Gas and Oil (OUGO) to promote the UK’s 
unconventional reserves of gas and oil, including shale gas and oil. 
 
The conventional sector has been regulated by means of licences, usually awarded following 
rounds of bidding that since 1994 must be publicly advertised in the Official Journal of the 
European Union.130 The onshore licensing system distinguishes between the exploration and 
production stages with different licences131, with production licences divided according to the 
specific features of the area and the company that is applying for them.132 The licence 
conditions are published in statutory instruments under the Petroleum Act 1998 and are known 
as model clauses. They are quite detailed in character.  
 
The key licence for a company seeking to carry out onshore hydrocarbons exploration and 
development is the Petroleum Exploration and Development Licence (PEDL). This grants the 
                                                 
129 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-of-energy-climate-change/about 
130 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 1994. 
131 The Petroleum Licensing (Exploration and Production) (Seaward and Landward Areas) Regulations 2004. 
132 Gordon, Greg. Paterson, John. Üşenmez, Emre. Oil and Gas Law- Current Practice and Emerging Trends. 
Dundee University Press. 2011. Page 71. 
52 
 
holder the exclusive right to pursue a range of oil and gas exploration activities, subject to 
necessary drilling/development consents and planning permission. Each PEDL confers such 
rights over a limited area and for defined phases. Exploration can last for three years (from 
2014) while up to six years was previously the norm for onshore hydrocarbons exploration. 
Appraisal can last for five years and requires the holder to draw up and submit a field 
development plan. The production phase for oil and natural gas is twenty years with a possible 
extension. Unless the licensee has made sufficient progress as the end of each phase to move 
to the next phase, it will expire. At the end of the exploration phase, no less than 50 per cent of 
the acreage must be given up. For shale gas reserves however, which are likely to be spread 
over a much wider area than conventional gas reserves, such a relinquishment obligation would 
be a disincentive. This was modified in 2014, so that this obligation is subject to a new power 
for the Minister to agree with the licensee on the establishment of Retention Areas and 
Development Areas: if the licensee company seeks to make a part of its Licensed Area into a 
Retention Area, it must submit a Retention Area Plan describing the exploration and appraisal 
activities that the licensee intends to carry out in the Retention Area. The Minister can approve 
this application and the licensee retains the area sought into the second term. The same can 
happen with a Development Area. It is also possible for the licensed area that is surrendered or 
retained to be identified in three rather than two dimensions.  
 
When this onshore licensing regime was expanded to include shale gas and oil, there were – 
initially at least - only a few differences between them. DECC advised in 2013 that there is no 
firm licensing distinction between exploration for shale gas and exploration for conventional 
oil and gas. Some companies which are drilling mainly for conventional oil and gas have 
decided to drill deeper than they otherwise might have, to see whether there is prospective shale 
in their licensed areas.  
 
Before fracking can take place, however, certain permitting requirements beyond those in the 
PEDL need to be complied with. In a 2013 ‘regulatory roadmap’, the then department 
responsible (DECC) noted the following four consents as required before a licensee could 
commence full exploration activity: environmental consents; departmental consent to drill a 
well and undertake fracturing; planning permission and land access consents from landowners. 
In the UK the focus is on requirements for consents that are necessary for shale gas (rather than 
oil) exploration and not production since none is yet taking place. Where the licensee seeks to 
progress from exploration to production, it will need to go through a second round of regulatory 
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consents. Given the lack of experience of this phase by regulators, we can assume that this part 
of the process is still evolving.   
 
Some brief comments on each of these four consent processes seems necessary to fill in an 
important regulatory space. The first set of consents required by shale gas operators includes 
mining waste permits; a water abstraction licence; groundwater activity permits; radioactive 
substances activity permits, and assessment and approval of chemicals used for hydraulic 
fracturing. An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) may also be required. 
 
The second set of consents relates to drilling and is obtained from the government department. 
They are influenced by an incident in northern England in 2011, where earth tremors were 
alleged to have been triggered by the UK’s first shale production test. Now, shale gas operators 
are required to: assess the seismic hazards presented by hydraulic fracturing activity in each 
well site area; monitor the seismic activity of the well site area and develop and implement a 
mitigation plan for possible earthquakes caused by hydraulic fracturing. A real-time trigger has 
also to be installed that will act to cut off injection into a well if there is a significant risk of an 
earthquake. 
 
A third set of consents concerns planning permission. In England and Wales this is managed 
by the minerals planning authorities (MPAs), a kind of local authority that has responsibility 
for planning control of works carried out in connection with mineral development. The MPAs 
are required to carry out consultations and decide on an application within 13 weeks. The 
considerations they have to take into account relevant to unconventional resource development 
include: air quality, traffic, risk of contamination to land, wildlife and land stability.  
 
Finally, there are consents from the relevant landowners. In contrast to large parts of the US, 
the landowners do not own the resources in the ground and so they are not entitled to sell shale 
gas or oil reserves located under their land. However, they are entitled to compensation through 
land access agreements paid by a shale operator (for rights of access and the location of the 
drilling pad itself). A company seeking access is also required to have permission from all 
landowners under whose land they drill. This has been modified however, as is discussed below 




The UK has, alongside Norway, one of the most stringent onshore drilling safety regimes in 
the world. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) monitors shale gas operations from a well 
integrity and site safety perspective. They are charged with ensuring that safe working practices 
are adopted by onshore operators as required under the Health and Safety at Work Etc., Act 
1974. Regulations made under the Act include:  
 
• The Borehole Site and Operations Regulations 1995 (BSOR) applies to shale 
gas operations. (These regulations are primarily concerned with the health and 
safety management of the site).  
• The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc.) 
Regulations 1996 (DCR) apply to all wells drilled with a view to the extraction 
of petroleum regardless of whether they are onshore or offshore. 
 
The above regime was first used for unconventional energy in 2008 with the grant of a promote 
(exploration) license to Cuadrilla Resources and Lucas Energy. The license included a working 
programme of 400 km of 2D seismic data in the first part of the initial term and a drill or drop 
commitment for well of 1000 m in depth. 
 
5.3.2 Specific Initiatives and Innovations 
The UK Government has been proactive in its express policy support for a shale gas sector. 
Initially, in its own version of Shale 1.0, it simply adapted the existing regime for conventional 
hydrocarbons development to the harnessing of unconventional resources. At the same time, it 
faced public concerns about safety and environmental issues which led briefly to the imposition 
of a moratorium on development while ongoing research was completed into a number of 
issues. The context of public concern and uncertainty about resource potential had the effect of 
preventing the emergence of a new industry in unconventional resources. The regulatory 
regime was one of the variables which government was able to affect if it chose to do so. 
Several initiatives were subsequently taken, with three notable changes to the regulatory 
regime: planning rules; faster processing of shale gas licence applications; and improved rules 





In England and Wales, proposals for shale gas exploration or extraction are subject to the 
requirements of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 administered by the Minerals 
Planning Authority (MPA) for the area in which the development is located. Consents and 
other permissions are only provided by BEIS once planning permission has been obtained by 
the MPA. 
 
Planning decision-making is based in accordance with the policies set out in the National 
Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) and the “minerals” section of the online Planning Practice 
Guidance (PPG). Further, when a decision is made on a planning application, only planning 
matters called “material considerations” can be taken into account. There is no exhaustive list 
of what constitutes a material planning consideration, although the PPG lists some “principal 
issues” for consideration. These can include: noise associated with the operation; dust; air 
quality; lighting; visual impact; landscape character; traffic; risk of contamination; land 
stability/subsidence; ecological/biodiversity importance; surface and ground water issues; 
water abstraction. 
 
The UK Government is currently consulting on changes to the NPPF to provide very implicit 
support for shale gas from MPAs. Currently, the National Planning Policy Framework says: 
“When determining planning applications, local planning authorities should “give great 
weight to be benefits of mineral extraction, including to the economy.” The Government 
wants to change this to “Minerals planning authorities should: ‘recognise the benefits 
of on-shore oil and gas development, including unconventional hydrocarbons, for the 
security of energy supplies and supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy; and 
put in place policies to facilitate their exploration and extraction’”.133 
 
Faster Decisions on Shale Gas Planning Applications 
Other changes to speed up planning decision-making have included removing the need in 2014 
to notify individual owners of land and tenants on ground where only underground operations 
                                                 
133 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2018. National Planning Policy Framework: 





may take place (i.e. not the actual above ground development).134 In 2015, the UK Government 
announced a number of additional measures aimed at the shale gas sector.135 The Secretary of 
State for Communities and Local Government will make the final decision on planning appeals 
related to exploring and developing shale gas, thus removing the role of the planning inspector. 
This change is limited to a two-year period, although it might be extended.  
 
The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government also has powers to ‘call-in’ 
shale gas applications before they are decided by the local planning authority and identifying 
underperforming local planning authorities. The statutory deadline for determining a planning 
application where an application is subject to Environmental Impact Assessment is 16 weeks. 
The UK Government would identify underperforming local planning authorities that 
“repeatedly fail” to determine oil and gas applications within statutory timeframes. When such 
applications are made to underperforming local planning authorities, the Secretary of State will 
be able to consider whether to determine the application instead of the local planning authority.  
 
Opposition to fracking has usually been expressed through delays and problems on the licenses 
granted by local councils in the use of land. The Government decided to increase the 
competence of the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, by giving the 
said Secretary of State the capacity to act as final decision-maker on appeals for licenses related 
to shale gas developments. In addition, the same public officer has the power call in shale gas 
applications before they are decided and to identify underperforming local planning authorities. 
This increase and centralization of power in Westminster (at the UK Government level) over 
local decisions is an approach that demonstrates the importance of shale gas developments for 
a national energy strategy. 
 
At a site in England where licences have been granted to Cuadrilla Resources, work had not 
yet started after six years.136  
 
                                                 
134 Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure and Section 62A Applications) (England) 
(Amendment No. 2) Order 2013 (SI 2013/3194). 
135 DECC and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2015. Policy Paper – Shale gas and oil 
policy statement – 13 August 2015 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/shale-gas-and-oil-policy-
statement-by-decc-and-dclg> 
136 Jillian Ambrose, 2018. Fracking firm Cuadrilla to reignite West Sussex plans. 
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The Infrastructure Act 2015 
This is a major piece of legislation that aims to streamline the underground access regime to 
make it easier for companies to drill for shale gas.137 Under the previous system, licence holders 
did not have automatic access rights to drill under landowners’ property and had to seek 
permission before they could do so. If permission was refused, then licence holders could apply 
through the Secretary of State and courts to gain access, but the Government considered this 
route to be too time consuming. This effectively removes trespass rights for landowners for 
underground access below 300 metres. The Infrastructure Act 2015 also extended the 
Community benefits approach to shale gas. Under this approach, the industry agreed to pay 
£100,000 to communities per hydraulically-fractured well site at exploratory stage, and 1% of 
revenue if it successfully goes into production. In addition, the industry confirmed that 
operators would contribute a voluntary one-off payment of £20,000 for the right to use deep-
level land for each unique lateral well that extends by more than 200 metres and would notify 
the public when exercising this power. 
 
Environmental Considerations 
The potential effects that shale gas development may have on the environment are a paramount 
concern for a portion of the society in the UK, which has expressed it through public 
demonstrations, such as the one that occurred in Lancashire in 2013, and elsewhere around the 
UK where shale gas activities are planned or taking place 138 
 
One of these concerns refers to the potential contamination of water through a leak on the 
integrity of the well. This issue was raised by the UK House of Commons Energy and Climate 
Change Committee inquiry in 2011,139 and the government reiterated in their response to the 
inquiry findings that the regulatory agencies in charge of energy and petroleum have dealt with 
lateral drilling and fracturing before, thus meaning that they have existing current technical 
capability to regulate this new industry. Referring to the integrity of the well, a scheme to 
prevent contamination in offshore well was has also been applied before, and it is also 
                                                 
137 It is worth noting that the Infrastructure Act 2015 changes to the underground access regime will also apply to 
geothermal energy. 
138 BBC. Frack Off Protesters rig blockades. June 18th, 2012. 





applicable for this purpose.140 In addition, the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of 
Engineering considered that because fracking occurs at a considerable distance from aquifers, 
it is not very likely that they may be affected by the fracturing operation.141 
 
Fracking has a very intensive use of water, which has been highlighted as another cause for 
concern. According to the UK Government in 2016, the use of water would depend on the 
requirements of each site, and the heavy regulatory process for the use of water, would provide 
enough opportunities to evaluate the sustainable use of water, allowing the relevant regulators 
to make decisions on the licenses for the use of water, without endangering the supply of such 
an important liquid.142  
 
The disposal of the water used or produced during the fracking process has also been a 
controversial issue in several jurisdictions, including the UK. Current EU and UK regulation 
do not allow the re-injection of the water into the well, and therefore it needs to be processed 
and disposed elsewhere.143 
  
In April 2011, some seismic events occurred near an area where fracking operations were 
carried out and the company involved stated that they would postpone operations. The response 
from the UK Government was to impose a moratorium that lasted for 10 months.144 The BGS 
as well as the Environmental Agency carried out studies and on December 2012, fracking 
activities could resume. 
 
Today the regulation includes additional requirements such as: 
• Conduct a prior examination of existing faults and seismic risks. 
• Submit a report to BEIS on how seismic risk would be addressed. 
                                                 
140 House of Commons Library, 2017. Briefing Paper Number 60703: Shale gas and fracking 13 April 2017 
<http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06073> 
141 The Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering, 2012. Shale gas extraction in the UK: a review of 
hydraulic fracturing – June 2012 <https://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/shale-gas-extraction/2012-06-
28-shale-gas.pdf> 
142 House of Commons Library, 2017. Briefing Paper Number 60703: Shale gas and fracking 13 April 2017 
<http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06073> 
143 O´Donnell, M.C. et al. Wastewater from hydraulic fracturing in the UK:  assessing the viability and cost of 
management. Environmental Science: Water Resources and Technology. Vol. 4. 2018 
144 Thomson Reuters. Government lifts moratorium on UK shale gas hydraulic fracturing. January 22nd, 2013. 
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• Implement seismic monitoring before and during the fracturing job, including the use 
of the “traffic light” system to established to continue, reassess or stop the fracking 
activity.145 
 
An example of the influence of the American experience is that of the need to share any 
resultant financial benefits from shale gas developments with the communities that must bear 
the effects associated with shale gas exploration and production. Even though the principles 
and systems of ownership of resources underground is very different between the UK and the 
US, the idea to provide additional benefits to land owners and residents of the area where the 
fracking activity takes place appears like the individual compensation that occurs in the US, 
primarily due to the private ownership of underground resources. Therefore, the possibility that 
the companies agree to pay £100,000 to communities per hydraulically-fractured well site at 
the exploratory stage, and 1% of revenue if it successfully goes into production, creates a new 
model of private compensation for the residents instead of providing general compensation to 
society only through taxes and royalties. 
 
The government has issued for public consultation a proposal to create an allowance for shale 
gas exploration and production that would reduce the tax portion on the income from a 
company from 62% to 30%.146 
 
Experience of other jurisdictions, such as the US, on how to face the potential risks, becomes 
useful for the new developments in the UK. An example of this is the fact that the re-injection 
of water cannot be carried out in the UK, following the lead of North Carolina,147 and looking 
to avoid the potential effects on seismic activity that such practice may have. 
 
5.4 Challenges and Locally Crafted Solutions  
 
The initial approach of adapting the current licensing system for conventional resources for a 
new use and maintaining the jurisdiction of already existent government bodies on the design 
of policy and regulation of the subject have both proved insufficient. A new agency, the Office 
                                                 




147 Resources for the Future. The State of State Shale Gas Regulation. May 2013. Page 53. 
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for Unconventional Gas and Oil, was created to demonstrate the commitment of the UK 
Government in developing this resource and has become as a key element of UK energy policy. 
 
Regulatory divergence inside the UK is a factor that impacts on the prospects for 
unconventional development. The Scotland Act 2016 devolved shale gas licensing to the 
Scottish Parliament, and the Wales Act 2017 includes provisions to devolve shale gas licensing 
to the National Assembly for Wales. To date, the devolved administrations had adopted a 
negative approach to unconventional resource development. In 2015, the Scottish Government 
announced a moratorium on fracking in Scotland which was extended to an outright ban in 
2017. In 2015, the Welsh Government issued a Direction preventing local planning authorities 
from approving developments which included fracking,148 whilst in the same year the Northern 
Ireland Assembly included a “presumption against” fracking in planning policy guidance.149 
Subsequent to the decisions against unconventional hydrocarbons in the devolved nations, the 
main UK opposition party (The Labour Party) announced that it would ban fracking when next 
in government.150   
 
5.5 Assessment 
The UK has taken an approach based on the robustness of its already existing regulatory 
framework, and its applicability to unconventional hydrocarbons. The assumption seems to 
have been that decades of experience with conventional resource regulation – primarily 
offshore - make this existing set of legal instruments suitable, particularly when backed by the 
proven technical capacity of the personnel in charge of enforcing it. However, the technical 
reality of unconventional hydrocarbons is very different than those facing offshore exploration 
and production activities, and additional risks have needed to be addressed, requiring the 
modifications summarised in this section. 
 
                                                 
148 The Welsh Government, 2017. The Town and Country Planning (Notification) (Unconventional Oil and Gas) 
Wales Direction 2015 <http://gov.wales/topics/planning/policy/dear-cpo-letters/unconventional-oil-and-
gas/?lang=en> 
149 Northern Ireland Planning Portal, 2015. Strategic Planning Policy Statement for Northern Ireland – Planning 
for Sustainable Development (SPPS) <https://www.planningni.gov.uk/spps> 




The creation of an agency to promote unconventional hydrocarbons, modifications to the 
powers of the central government in local issues, and changes in regulations for underground 
drilling, appear to demonstrate this need to adapt. 
 
The evolving character of the UK’s constitutional framework has created obstacles for the 
scope of unconventional resource development in the UK. The total ban in Scotland and the 
strong position against fracking in Northern Ireland and Wales contrast strongly with the 
approach taken by the central government and limit or prohibit the growth of unconventional 
resource operations in these parts of the UK. Even in England, the need to adapt the established 
regime to allow greater engagement by local communities and authorities indicates that 
challenges remain, which are analogous to those facing most infrastructure projects. 
 
Overall, despite policy and regulatory interventions to support the growth of an unconventional 
resource industry in much of the UK, shale gas and oil drilling remain after several years at an 
exploratory stage and industry’s efforts to improve their knowledge of the true level of 






Table 6.1 provides a summary of the main features of Shale 1.0 in the first column and lists the 
responses of the three countries in the next three columns. There are significant differences in 
response, with the UK probably emerging as the one most likely to follow the US in the 
development of shale resources, despite territorial restrictions and ongoing issues with respect 
to the social licence to operate. 
 
Ownership. A defining feature of the economic success of Shale 1.0 was the ownership 
arrangements characterising hydrocarbons development in certain parts of the United States. 
The land owner owned the hydrocarbons and had a commercial incentive to participate in shale 
gas development. Replicating that financial incentive to landowners in a regime with state 
ownership of the resources is, as the UK example demonstrates, a challenge. This is not a 
matter of lacking a social licence to operate but rather finding a substitute for an important 
commercial incentive. The ability of companies to secure rights from private owners of land 
quickly was one of the key variables for that early success which cannot be replicated outside 
of the USA, where public ownership of hydrocarbons is the norm.  
 
However, the case studies suggest that this observation may be less fundamental than it 
appears. In each case, the national authority has sufficient legal powers to create arrangements 
that can offer private investors similar and sufficient legal security to be able to support 
unconventional resource activity. However, as in many parts of the USA and Canada, local (or 
Provincial or State) authorities have legal competences in areas that would allow them to delay 
or hold up projected developments in densely populated areas. In Colombia, local community 
preferences (rather than those of private landowners) will play a decisive role in the future of 
unconventional resource development.  
 
Infrastructure. Availability of local infrastructure is a key consideration which in many cases 
involves its construction. Argentina has made extensive efforts to encourage this. However, 
the effects of its elaborate local content policy in this and other respects are still unclear. As a 
way of improving the benefits to the national economy of shale development this policy 
emphasis emulates the approach taken in many countries with respect to conventional 




Environment. The environmental aspect is also less straightforward than it may seem. In 
principle, there is no reason why environmental laws cannot be adjusted to address the 
challenges of new technologies such as fracking. If this is one of the reasons behind the lack 
of a social licence to operate, it seems capable of being addressed and over time improved 
upon.  
 
Regulation. Regulatory authority responsible for oversight and monitoring can be designed to 
ensure that it avoids conflicts of interest and where more than one body exists, that cooperation 
among agencies is achievable. A key area is the relationship between conventional and 
unconventional activity on the same area. This can be positive and negative, and ought to be 
anticipated in the design of regulations to maximize potential gains for the host state and 
minimize uncertainties for the investor. 
  
Macroeconomic and social considerations. In each case there was an impact of wider, non-
energy considerations on the policy choices. In Argentina’s case, the shale sector is influenced 
by the country’s wider economic problems in its recent history and efforts to move beyond 
them; in Colombia the recent civil conflict leaves a legacy that threatens infrastructure in this 
area; and in the UK the rapid decline in revenues from North Sea oil and gas have returned the 
economy to energy dependence on external sources after a period of several decades, leading 
to a search for new choices in the energy mix.  
 
Outcomes for further consideration. There has been little in this study to suggest that the 
diversity in state structures, from federal to provincial to local, creates a major fact of difference 
between them. Similarly, the mix of civil and common law regimes has not yielded any points 
of difference in the various country studies. These differences may exist but are not evident in 
this study. It may also be the case that further examination of tax and fiscal arrangements could 
be carried out for the host state and for foreign and local investors. This goes beyond the scope 
of the present study. 
  
In determining the pace of establishment of shale operations in Shale 2.0, an important factor 
will be the application of generally accepted regulatory and contractual practices. The 
developments in the countries examined in this paper in the light of their own special and even 
unique country settings may contribute to the development of government responses to industry 
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interest in shale resource development. In each case considered here, the governments were 
alive to the benefits of greater energy independence which the development of unconventional 
hydrocarbons resources appears to offer. At the same time, where the social impact of shale 
gas development is likely to be high such as in areas with high population density (and 
Argentina is the exception here), opposition to this energy choice is likely to be significant.  
 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of Shale Gas Country Conditions in relation to Shale 1.0 Template 
 
Shale 1.0:  
US Template 
Argentina Colombia UK 
Ownership (private 
landowners with 
incentives in key regions) 
State ownership but 
sharing of powers with 
provinces in federal 
structure; energy policy 
is federal competence 
State ownership State ownership, with 
revenue-sharing scheme 
for local communities; 
land access agreements 
give compensation to 
landowners from shale 
operators 
Allocation of Rights by 
Lease 
Extensive provincial 
powers over licensing: to 
extend licences; approve 
assignment; revoke and 
impose penalties. New 
concession created in 
2014 for exploitation of 
unconventional resources 
Concession arrangement 
with model containing 
incentives for 
unconventional resource 
E&P; special regulations 
and procedures in place 
for claims of overlapping 
rights-holders 
Licences evolved from 
existing conventional 
pattern to include 
Retention Areas and 
Development Areas; 
consents required beyond 
those in the licences 
(including 
environmental, planning 




office for shale gas and 
oil promotion set up 
Players: corporate 
investors available with 
expertise and access to 
capital/service 
companies 
Dominated by large 
foreign companies; local 
content policy to build up 
supply chain industry, 
Foreign companies with 
possible role for 
Ecopetrol; no local 
content policy to build up 
supply chain 
Limited corporate 
interest to date but 
regime open to foreign 
and domestic investors 
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especially at provincial 
level 
Pipeline infrastructure & 
capacity 
Bottleneck; funding and 
regulatory issues need to 
be addressed if US model 
of exporting shale gas is 
to be followed 
Infrastructure limited and 
in need of investment 
Provision made for 
improved rules on 
infrastructure 
Water supply and 
evolving regulation 
Regulatory controls in 
place over water supply 
Re-injection is possible; 
limits to drilling in 
relation to aquifers and 
EIAs required 




activity permit required; 
disposal of water may be 
an issue for regulation if 
production takes off 
Location in areas of low 
population density, 
limiting social licence to 
operate barriers 
Locations are far from 
population centres 
Exploration not in 
densely populated areas 
Population density high 
so social licence is an 
issue but note regulatory 
divergence inside UK 
with moratorium in 
Scotland 
Deep capital markets Not available locally Not available locally Available but no 
production yet 
High natural gas 
prices/gas demand 
Need to export gas rather 
than use for domestic 
consumption 
Need to export gas rather 
than use for domestic 
consumption 
Yes 
Royalties & taxes Provinces take 12% 
royalty share on sale of 
hydrocarbons; payments 
in kind are possible 
Tax incentive: royalty is 
only 60% of conventional 
production 
Proposal to create 
allowance to reduce tax 
potion on income from 
companies from 62% to 
30% 
 
